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There is a correlation between American grand strategy and post-Cold War national 
identity.  Congressional leaders, policy makers, scholars, and observers have noted that 
the United States lacked a coherent grand strategy for the immediate post-Cold War era.  
However, President Bill Clinton built a grand strategy of selected engagement predicated 
it on the historical values of modern American national identity.  Through published 
national security data, speeches, and observations of strategic choices, this research 
compared President Clinton’s actions in the international arena to a grand strategy 
typology.  Further, through the theoretical lens of constructivism, an assessment of 
President Clinton’s national identity construct, and its correlation with his strategic use of 
national power, was conducted.  This research may be beneficial to ongoing defense 
threat reduction research on predictive factors of national activity.  This research may 
also facilitate positive social change by enabling policy makers, scholars, the U.S. 
electorate, and political observers to better understand the importance of presidentially 
constructed national identity and its impact on grand strategy.  For instance, presidential 
debates may evolve to include inquiries about a candidate’s perspective on national 
identity and how that ideational construct would influence strategic planning and 
operations during their tenure.  Americans may then be able to better estimate the 





American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era 
by 
Norman T. Carter Jr. 
 
MSIR, Troy University, 2009 
BS, Excelsior College, 2005 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 








This research effort is dedicated to Jesus Christ, who teaches me to make a 
difference in this world, sometimes one person at a time, or here, whole nations.  This 
study is also dedicated to my children: Normlica, Dima, and Norman James, Cesar, 
Mario, Ma’elm, Cris, Mahrael, and Miaelle, whom I hope will be inspired to challenge 
themselves, each other, and strive for their best.  Do something different, do something 
strong, do something courageous, to grow yourself,  and someone else… even nations. 
Thank you, Norman Jr., (“Minnie Me”) for challenging me, encouraging me, and 
forgiving me for the lack of playtime- there are yet more fish to in front of us! Thank you 
Normlica, my darling daughter, for your patience and persistence.  And thank you 
Normlica, for trying to follow in my footsteps, for trying to catching up to me and 
making me go farther faster. Thank you, Dima, for pushing me to be better than myself, 
for watching me to see what kind of Dad I’d be.  Hopefully, prayerfully, I’ve set a good 
example.  
 Thanks to Cesar, Mario, Ma’elm, Cris, Mahrael, and Miaelle, who waited, 
however impatiently, for me to find the time to invest in the invaluable experience of 
playtime- NOW we can go outside and run around!  
Thank you, Marilyn, the love of my life, for encouraging me with your warm 






I am very grateful to Dr. Milen, Dr. Ross, and Dr. Frampton for their patience, 





Table of Contents 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................v 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................1 
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................1 
American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the 20th Century .................... 2 
National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Modern Era ....................................... 3 
Defining Cold War Grand Strategy ........................................................................ 5 
The Problem Statement ..................................................................................................7 
The Problem is Current, Relevant, and Significant .......................................................7 
Purpose ...........................................................................................................................9 
Research Questions ......................................................................................................10 
Theoretical Foundation ................................................................................................10 




Potential Sociopolitical Significance ...........................................................................18 
Summary ......................................................................................................................19 
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................20 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................20 
Literature Search Strategy............................................................................................22 
 
ii 
Finding and Sorting the Literature for Review ..................................................... 26 
Theoretical Foundation ................................................................................................26 
Literature Review.........................................................................................................26 
The Nature of Constructivism ............................................................................... 26 
Review of Identity Theory .................................................................................... 33 
Review of Grand Strategy ..................................................................................... 40 
Research Methodologies ....................................................................................... 64 
The Gap in the Literature ...................................................................................... 66 
Summary ......................................................................................................................67 
Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................68 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................68 
Research Design and Rationale ...................................................................................68 
Research Questions ............................................................................................... 70 
The Study’s Grounding Concept .......................................................................... 70 
The Researcher’s Role .................................................................................................71 
Methodology ................................................................................................................72 
Data Management ................................................................................................. 72 
Data Types ............................................................................................................ 74 
Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 75 
Data Analysis and Interpretation .......................................................................... 76 
Data Software........................................................................................................ 79 
Data Coding .......................................................................................................... 79 
 
iii 
Quality Standards .........................................................................................................81 
Validity, Reliability, Bias, and Ethics ................................................................... 81 
Ethical Considerations and Protections ................................................................ 86 
Sample Size ........................................................................................................... 86 
Summary ......................................................................................................................87 
Chapter 4: Results ..............................................................................................................89 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................89 
Data Management ........................................................................................................89 
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 90 
Evidence of Trustworthiness................................................................................. 92 
Results ..........................................................................................................................93 
The Use of Constructivism in Identity Politics ..................................................... 93 
Strategy Publication and Support.......................................................................... 96 
The Use of National Power (Hard and Soft) ....................................................... 102 
Grand Strategy Determination ............................................................................ 103 
Observations and Results .................................................................................... 114 
Summary ....................................................................................................................116 
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ..........................................118 
Introduction ................................................................................................................118 
Summary of the Study ........................................................................................ 119 
Interpretation of the Findings.....................................................................................120 




Implications for Positive Sociopolitical Impact .........................................................122 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................125 
References ........................................................................................................................128 
Appendix A: National Power Projection Timeline 1993-2000 ........................................160 
Appendix B: Word Frequency Chart ...............................................................................165 




List of Tables 




List of Figures 






Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
American national identity and grand strategy are essential to U.S. national 
security, achievement of international goals and objectives, and to the many nations that 
aligned with the United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  Analyzing 
national identity encourages reflection on the use of the four components of state power: 
diplomacy, information, military, and the economy (DIME), to achieve national security 
ends (Huntington, 2004).  This research was conducted to examine how American 
national identity influenced U.S. grand strategy and international activities during the 
Clinton Administration.  This research is important because President Clinton, as the first 
American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security environment without great 
power threats, with almost unlimited international political capital, and with undisputed 
national power (Hyland, 1999).  The grand strategy Clinton employed, and the national 
identity he used to justify that strategy, helped explain America’s world purpose at a 
pivotal moment in modern world and national history.  American national identity 
provided a salient and compelling element of national discourse as the president faced the 
opportunity to redefine America’s purpose in a new world order. 
Background of the Study 
National identity uses a group’s “individuality and distinctiveness” to differentiate 
them from others and unite them as a unit (Huntington, 2004, p. 21).  Identity is 
influenced by group experiences, shared history and values, and often shaped and 
expressed through group leader articulation.  By identifying the president as the “official” 
articulator of American national identity, there is a reduced validity and influence of 
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competing narratives from other political sectors (Beasely, 2004; Brands, 2014; Kupchan, 
2010; Metz, 2010).  National identity is an important causal factor of American behavior, 
especially as it relates to military action (Coles, 2002; Huntington, 2004; Lixin, 2010).  
Additionally, national identity explanations are often revised and publicized in 
preparation for military conflict because it can help stimulate public support by crafting 
the collective consciousness to produce interpretive frameworks that support the intended 
policy (Coles, 2002, p. 588). 
Presidents have used national identity to justify grand strategy shifts for decades.  
Grand strategy is the coordination of all national resources for a political goal (Liddell 
Hart, 1991, p. 322).  Grand strategy also helps prioritize national interests and allocate 
resources to support policy choices.  Grand strategy is essential to the projection of 
national power because it helps ensure the whole of government coordination of national 
resources for national security interests (Art, 2003).  This coordination helps prevent 
individual government agencies from inadvertently working at cross purposes with each 
other on global issues while increasing the efficiency of collaborative actions.   
American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the 20th Century 
The onset of WWI provided President Woodrow Wilson the opportunity to revise 
American national identity from that of premier republican example and global model of 
democracy to defender-of-liberty and world leader (Lixin, 2010).  The first phase of 
Wilson’s national identity redefinition emphasized America’s military and economic 
strength along with the growing perils in the European community.  Relying on American 
exceptionalism as an enduring component of American identity, Wilson explained the 
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importance of American involvement to secure and protect national values of freedom 
and liberty for all: “We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for 
the sacrifices we shall freely make.  We are but one of the champions of the rights of 
mankind” (Wilson, 1917, para. 34).  By using the power of the president’s national 
influence, Wilson effectively revised American national identity and reoriented its grand 
strategy to support that new identity infused with the moral obligation to spread 
democracy (Mead, 2005). 
National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Modern Era 
President Woodrow Wilson declared American foreign policy based on morals, 
strong ideals, and the spread of democracy (Department of State Historian, 2019).  U.S. 
involvement in World War II and sustained world leadership during the bipolar Cold War 
era signaled a significant national identity shift from passive democracy icon to active 
defender of and advocate for democracy (Boys, 2015, p. 8).  This transition included the 
grand strategy shift from quasi-isolationism for matters outside the Western hemisphere 
to internationalism and interventionism, but only during the war era (Brands, 2016; J. L. 
Gaddis, 2002).  After World War I, Congress rejected Wilson’s national identity and 
American participation in the League of Nations (Boys, 2015, p. 95).  However, during 
World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt revised American national identity to support 
a new grand strategy that prepared the nation for a new world era, the Cold War 
(Deudney & Ikenberry, 2012). 
Franklin Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” transformed presidential speeches into 
personal narratives from the president to the average Americans in their “living room” 
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(Biser, 2016).  Narratives were an effective communication tool because they helped the 
president’s message seem as though it was just one average American talking with 
another about matters of State (Biser, 2016).  The golden age of radio enabled the 
president to connect with the average American efficiently and directly.  President 
Roosevelt used these narratives not only to inform the public, but also to influence public 
opinion in support of his initiatives.  Of specific note was his 14th fireside chat, held on 
September 3, 1939, which informed Americans of the ongoing European war and 
introduced his “national policy” of support for the Allied Powers.  Specifically, he 
explained the concept of collective security, binding American security with that of other 
nations thousands of miles away (Roosevelt, 1939).  Roosevelt also invoked American 
Judeo-Christian values as core aspects of national identity and justification for not only 
defense of the American homeland but the projection of American power to protect 
victims of international aggression (Roosevelt, 1939).  President Roosevelt did not 
declare war in this narrative; however, he revived a national identity that prepared the 
country for generations of American global leadership (Biser, 2016). 
President Truman reemphasized Roosevelt’s American grand strategy and 
national identity to continue America’s international leadership role.  First, President 
Truman asked Americans to unite behind him as he projected American values of 
individual freedoms, human rights, civil liberties, and the expansion of representative 
government (Truman, 1945).  Second, he equated American national security concerns 
with the extension of American values of freedom from coercion and subjugation in his 
1947 speech advocating aid to Turkey and Greece in their fight against the growing 
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communist threat (Truman, 1947).  The Truman Doctrine solidified American 
international leadership in the new bipolar world, with materiel support for those 
specifically countering communist insurgents (Truman, 1947).  The Marshall Plan and 
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enshrined this strategy in 
world history. 
President Dwight Eisenhower codified American grand strategy through the 
Solarium Project at the U.S. State Department.  George Keenan and others on the U.S. 
State Department’s policy planning staff produced what would be called the grand 
strategy of Soviet “Containment.”  While “containing” and limiting communist 
expansion were the strategic “ends,” the “ways” or methods used to employ resources 
varied across presidential administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).  However, American 
national identity of world leadership endured across both Republican and Democratic 
administrations (Art, 2003). 
Defining Cold War Grand Strategy 
Cold War grand strategy was predicated on U.S. activism in the world 
community, the product of a new American identity of leadership across multiple 
paradigms of national power, militarily, informationally, diplomatically, and 
economically.  Emerging victorious from WWII, American identity of exceptionalism 
fueled the international activist tendencies of Cold War leaders.  This new identity 
provided consistent geopolitical “ends” through all nine successive presidential 
administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).  It is this national identity, at odds with isolationist 
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tendencies of early American international traditions, that provides recurring debates in 
the current and future direction of American grand strategy. 
American Cold War grand strategy was based on several key principles, at least 
partially divergent from previous era grand strategies and earlier American national 
identity (Art, 2003).  Around the world, the United States relied on selected national and 
regional leaders to support American initiatives and quell the spread of socialist 
tendencies in local populations.  Though the United States coordinated frequently with 
Western and Western-oriented partners for military initiatives, diplomacy, and economic 
sanctions, democracy promotion and the rule of law were consistent tenets of American 
foreign policy.  Table 1 offers a composite summary of Cold War national security 
principles, accompanying policies, and examples of how the policy was executed.   
Table 1 
 





Exceptionalism Democratic Republic icon 





Led or participated in many major 






Incursions into Mexico, Haiti, 
Grenada, etc. 
Multilateralism 
Created and lead global 
institutions, activities 
United Nations, NATO, Operation 
Desert Storm 
Pluralism 
Promote democracy and 
anti-authoritarianism 
Encouraged and supported national 
democratic initiatives around the 
world 
Rule of Law, 
Impartial 
Justice 
Adherence to international 
agreements and established 
norms 
Sanctions on war criminals, foreign 








Dominant defense budget, global 
commons guarantor 
Benevolence 
Support human rights and 
disaster relief in other 
countries 
Foreign aid, disaster relief, 
sanctions to promote human rights 
Note.  From Art (2003). 
The Problem Statement 
The context for this problem is the assertion that United States did not have a 
clearly defined national identity for a post-Cold War grand strategy (J. L. Gaddis, 2002; 
Kissinger, 2001; Martel, 2012).  Strategy must be based on a common understanding of 
American identity (Armed Services Committee, 2008), but research has suggested that 
the United States did not have a clearly articulated national identity to guide its 
immediate post-Cold War grand strategy, which led to political confusion, resource 
inefficiencies, and an absence of effective long-term planning and operations (Brands, 
2016; Cheney, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002).  As the first post-Cold War president, Clinton 
was unencumbered by the Soviet Union and the global struggle that entailed.  The 
problem this research attempted to resolve was understanding how Clinton identified and 
explained America’s post-Cold War national identity as a justification for his chosen 
grand strategy.  There has not been significant and deliberate research on American 
national identity and its influence on grand strategy in the post-Cold War era despite the 
creation of several collegiate grand strategy programs.  
The Problem is Current, Relevant, and Significant 
An effective grand strategy reflects American national identity, national values, 
protects national interests, and symbiotically organizes national resources to accomplish 
international security goals efficiently (Metz, 2010).  But according to research, 
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American grand strategy based on a clearly defined national identity had been absent 
since the fall of the Soviet Empire through the end of the century (Art, 2003; Brands, 
2016; Dueck, 2006, D. J. Gaddis, 2010; Kissinger, 2002).  There were several dimensions 
to this problem.  First, while there were several layers of published U.S. government 
security strategies, they were compartmentalized either by specific military service or the 
Department of Defense as a whole.  The issue, however, was that grand strategy 
encompasses the whole of government approach, synchronizing all elements of national 
power and influence: DIME.  Therefore, searching for a published grand strategy from an 
administration prior to 1986 was inconclusive.  However, Section 603 of the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act required the President to 
annually publish a national security strategy (NSS) and then listed elements of the 
definition of grand strategy as required components of this publication.  This requirement 
dedicates at least a section of the president’s published NSS to grand strategy.   
Second, democracies tend to require elected leaders justify their policies to curry 
continuous public support.  National identity provides useful components for this 
justification: a historically-based interpretation of “who we are” as a nation, the explicit 
cultural values that define Americans, the nation’s purpose in the international 
community, and a basis for inclusion and exclusion of others from peers and allies.  By 
connecting grand strategy proposals to these national identity components, presidents 
clarify and justify how and why their proposal supports America.  Though the president 
has been described as the author and guarantor of national identity (Abshire, 2013; 
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Beasely, 2004; Huntington, 2004), this research found only one document published by 
the Clinton administration detailing the national identity components: the NSS. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to examine post-Cold War American national 
identity and its impact on grand strategy.  I examined historical documents, presidential 
speeches, and other publications to ascertain how President Clinton designed and 
projected his version of national identity as justification for his grand strategy choices.  
These varied sources are important because presidents often use surrogates to advance 
their messages.  In terms of national security and international relations, there are few 
issues more important than a nation’s ability to effectively and efficiently project its 
national power as a reflection of itself (Art, 2003; Brands, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002).  
Who America is as a nation directly guides its priorities, its approach to international 
opportunities and threats, including where and how to use various elements of national 
power to project its image in the community of nations (Huntington, 2004). 
Understanding that American grand strategy changes in response to a potential 
evolution of national identity enables successive administration officials, foreign policy 
elites, and national security scholars to assess and determine several important foreign 
policy factors.  For example, President Woodrow Wilson revised his grand strategy, 
taking the United States into WWI with the Allied Powers, by describing American 
national identity as the guarantor of democracy around the world (Wilson, 1917).  
Understanding national identity’s influence on grand strategy can better enable officials 
to comprehend how their identity messaging supports and reinforces foreign policy goals.  
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By determining American national identity after the elimination of its longtime Soviet 
nemesis, social and political scientists may better chart the evolution of core American 
international interests in the context of varying degrees of national security threats.   
Research Questions 
This research was based on one fundamental question, with a subsequent 
question: 
RQ1: How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national 
identity? 
RQ2:  How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement 
his grand strategy? 
Theoretical Foundation 
This study’s theoretical framework was based on constructivism to understand 
and assess potential changes in American national identity.  Constructivism is the 
international relations theory that asserts nations are merely macrocosms of individuals 
and, as such, are prone to the same social dynamics of individuals and small groups 
(Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013).  Constructivism also asserts that national 
identity is not only a social construct but also a principle determinant of national activity 
(Huntington, 2004; Wendt, 1992). 
Constructivism framed the approach to understanding American national identity 
and how that identity defined America’s role and purpose in the international arena.  As 
an international relations theory, constructivism stipulates that the principles of human 
nature, along the lines of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, guide a state’s national strategy 
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(Chadwick, 2003; McLeod, 2014).  For example, as people feel the need for social 
inclusion in their community, states join regional and global coalitions and organizations 
to reaffirm their national identity and satisfy their social needs.  Similarly, to enforce 
international norms, leaders of dominant states may organize with other states to impose 
sanctions and possibly ostracize offending states from international organizations and 
forums (Wendt, 1992).  Further, Kantian and Hegelian assumptions of social psychology 
assert that a group’s identity requires an alter-ego to justify critical elements of its social 
identity (Lebow, 2008).  For example, the Soviet Union’s demise essentially removed a 
critical pillar of American national identity, creating the need for redefinition 
(Huntington, 2004). 
Grand strategy is also the product of national identity, which organizes how a 
nation determines and prioritizes its interests and projects its national power resources 
(DIME) in the international arena (Huntington, 2004).  By observing potential changes in 
American identity, it is possible to observe corresponding changes in U.S. grand strategy 
(Metz, 2010).  There is a basic assumption in grand strategy theory that asserts that every 
nation, with rational leaders, follows some strategic model regardless of how eclectic, 
erratic, or ambiguous their actions may seem, and regardless if that model was clearly 
defined or codified (Brands 2012, p. 76).  This assumption provided an important 
foundation for this research—that America had at least some systematic approach to 
using national power for achieving international objectives.  Post-Cold War changes in 
American grand strategy during the George W. Bush era were based on neo-realists’ 
perceptions of power between states and non-state actors and American identity as the 
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moral leader of the free world (Dueck, 2006).  In a constructivist sense, the new 
American grand strategy was reactive to changes in either national strategic culture 
(identity) or the distribution of power in the international arena (Dueck, 2006, p. 14).   
Definition of Terms 
Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff: The highest-ranking military official, the 
President’s personal military advisor (Hastedt, 2004). 
DIME: Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national 
power.  Political power and cultural influence are considered a part of informational 
power (Art, 2003).  Military and economic activities are considered “hard power,” and 
diplomatic and informational are considered “soft power” (Nye, 2009). 
Department of Defense: The Department of Defense  comprises six subordinate 
departments (Joint Chiefs, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard), and various 
supporting agencies.  The Department of Defense’s purpose is threat deterrence and 
national defense through the projection of military power (Hastedt, 2004). 
Department of State: The Department of State is the nation’s diplomatic corps, 
charged with managing treaties and agreements across a spectrum of national interests, 
executing public diplomacy and informational affairs (Hastedt, 2004). 
Defense strategic guidance:  Published by the secretary of defense, this document 
explains the application of military force, along with defense-related agencies, as an 
instrument of national power to accomplish NSS objectives.  The defense strategic 
guidance is written for consumption by agency leaders within the Department of Defense 
(Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 60). 
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Executive office of the president:  The Executive Office of the President is the 
complex of departments that serve to organize and execute the President’s directives 
(Kissinger, 2001). 
Grand strategy: The doctrine that identifies a nation’s identity, purpose, and 
position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities, and synchronizes 
resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): A tri-lateral trade agreement 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1994 (NAFTA, 2020). 
National defense strategy: Annual report by secretary of defense to Congress 
describing major military missions, their required force structure, and how the military 
will support the president’s NSS (U.S. Congress, 1986, Sec. 104e).   
National military strategy: Required publication by the chairman of the joint 
chiefs of staff to explain the distribution and application of military power to achieve 
NSS and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives.  The national military strategy explains 
the Joint Force (coordinated effort by all Department of Defense agencies), force 
development (through training and equipment), and force employment on military 
objectives (Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 152). 
National security strategy (NSS):  A congressionally mandated publication of 
presidential NSS (The Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, Sec. 104(b)).  A document 
approved by the president of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating 
the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national 
security. (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).  Because Section 
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603 of The Goldwater-Nichols Act listed elements of grand strategy’s definition as 
required components of the NSS, at least a section of the NSS should be considered an 
explanation of current U.S. grand strategy. 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I: Signed by American President Richard Nixon 
and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972, this agreement limited the number 
of nuclear launch sites and additional munitions restriction (Hastedt, 2004). 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II: Signed by American President George H.W. 
Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, this policy further reduced 
both nuclear arsenals to roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads, along with other 
munitions limitations (Sherman, 2014). 
Whole of government: The collaborative relationship between different 
government branches on a program, policy, or event (Kissinger, 2001). 
Assumptions 
This research involved certain assumptions to enable the framework to function.  
There is a pragmatic definition of grand strategy that can be correctly applied to national 
activities in the international arena.  A president’s grand strategy may not be succinctly 
articulated or delineated yet may still exist (Brands, 2012).  Presidents use rational 
approaches to determine how and when to employ American national power to influence 
international opportunities and challenges.  These assumptions are necessary to ensure 
the logical and predictable use of power.  Additionally, presidents use their explanation 
of national identity to justify their decisions on the international agenda.  These narratives 
serve to define the nation, national goals, and what the nation aspires to become (Abshire, 
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2013, p. 51).  This research was predicated on the determination that national identity 
tenets directly influence grand strategy priorities. 
Limitations 
In this case study, I examined examples where President Clinton and his 
administration used national identity to justify and explain grand strategic choices and 
activities.  This study used a normative approach that required the interpretation of 
speeches and proclamations.  The interpretation was that the president tried to legitimize 
grand strategy choices through rhetorical validation in the public sphere, most clearly 
with his NSSs.  Unpopular or perceivably unjustifiable choices tended not to be accepted 
or pursued long term, and the U.S. Constitution provided the president with latitude in 
foreign affairs (Krebs, 2015).  The greatest limitations are associated with the fact that 
not every instance of international coordination and conflict could be observed and 
measured for this study.  There were classified decisions and activities with parameters 
unknown to the public that were made within the limits of President Clinton’s published 
grand strategy. 
Another possible limitation of this study was mentioned at a congressional 
hearing on grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008).  The Cold War’s grand 
strategy of “containment” was devised in response to a known threat, identifiable, and 
straightforwardly confronted (Brands, 2016; J. L. Gaddis, 1982).  But Dr. Mitchell Reiss 
(2008) explained to the 110th Congress that the post-Cold War era may be far too 
complex a strategic environment for a single over-arching grand strategy to be designed 
for (p. 27).  His assumption was echoed by General Jack Keene, Vice Chairman of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff (Armed Services Committee, 2008).  However, this research was not 
intended to determine how a grand strategy is created, or if one can be designed 
considering the complications of the 21st century.  Because Section 603 of the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act required the inclusion of grand strategy tenets in the president’s 
annually published NSS, this research asserts President Clinton did produce the requisite 
grand strategy explanations in each of his published NSSs from 1994 through 2000.  It is 
President Clinton’s seven NSSs, published annually, that were observed for this research.  
The literature review clarified this assertion with a broader understanding of grand 
strategy and national identity.  
Delimitations 
There were several delimitations to this research.  I analyzed communications of 
senior administration officials that explained how and why they used national resources 
to solve challenges in the international arena.  Some activities and communications were 
prioritized above others based on their proximity to the president.  Activities and actions 
placed further from the president’s sphere were valued less than others and excluded 
from this study simply because the need to limit and use the most valuable data possible.  
However, every effort was made to ensure the research questions were saturated with 
relevant data. 
Selecting the temporal limits for this research was an important delimitation, as 
that automatically included and excluded some data sets.  This research was bounded by 
the Clinton administration terms in office (1993–2000) because his terms represented the 
first new presidency after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it presented a finite amount of 
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data that could reasonably be accessed.  Several authors specifically identified the 
December 25th, 1991, resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union as end of the Cold War and a turning point in the history 
of U.S. foreign policy (Brands, 2014; Bremmer, 2015; Nojeim & Kilroy, 2011).  
Additionally, the event was a critical junction in American national identity because the 
Cold War structure significantly influenced states’ identities and roles based on their 
position in the international system (Dueck, 2006; Huntington, 2006; Kissinger, 1996).  
Therefore, the international structural change resulting from the end of the Cold War 
could have produced a new American national identity.  However, I did not include the 
George H. W. Bush administration because they were steeped in Cold War traditions as 
evidenced by Bush’s tenure in the Reagan administration and the Cheney/Wolfowitz 
Strategic Planning Guidance (Tyler, 1992) that proposed an aggressively hegemonic 
grand strategy.  The Cheney/Wolfowitz strategy was rejected by President Bush and not 
officially published. 
Delimitation was evidenced by the choices of speeches and communications 
included in this data.  Though not every public pronouncement referred to national 
security, as much as possible I selected communications that specifically addressed both 
national identity and the use of national power.  This choice helped ensure the data and 
findings were relevant and consistent with the research topic.  It is important to note that 
limited oppositional narratives were considered as data.  The relevance of various 
narratives offered by political opponents was specifically addressed by Krebs (2015) and 
helped focus data analysis. 
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Potential Sociopolitical Significance 
This study offered the potential for significant contribution to the social and 
political implications of determining American foreign policy in addition to grand 
strategy implications.  This research of American national identity evolution may 
contribute evidence of how the nation develops its foreign policy without predetermined 
ideological obligations.  By conducting a case study of the first post-Cold War 
presidential administration, I was able to ascertain how America defined itself and 
determined its place in the immediate post-Cold War world without a global opponent.  
This research is not only teleological but introspective of American world leadership as 
well.  Being scholarly in nature, this research produced results without the ideologically 
prescriptive requirements many journalists and political pundits find themselves 
obligated to produce. 
The social implications for this research may be just as significant.  Because this 
research was politically introspective, the results can help ascertain the social, political, 
and cultural implications of current and future generations determining America’s place 
in the world through the construct of national identity.  Just as the 21st century has seen 
considerable changes in American domestic politics, those changes are bound to 
influence American self-image, and by implications, its international obligations and the 
strategies to achieve them.  This research may demonstrate that as American domestic 




I examined the activities and communications of the first post-Cold War 
American president to determine if and how he defined American national identity as a 
legitimating force for a chosen grand strategy.  Grand strategy identifies the nation’s 
identity, purpose, and position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities, 
and synchronizes resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).  
This chapter outlined the trajectory of American national identity, showing a nation 
developing its place in regional then global affairs.  America consolidated its identity as 
the “leader of the free world” in World War II and the Cold War as the protagonist for 
regional stability in Europe, international security, and democracy promotion with the 
grand strategy that directly confronted the global Soviet threat.  The Soviet Union imbued 
U.S. foreign policy with a clearly defined adversary and a noble national identity.   
The end of the Cold War provided America the opportunity to reconceptualize its 
purpose, national identity, and position in the evolving global arena (Layne, 1998).  This 
research is determined to settle the debate by determining if and how President Clinton 
redesigned America’s national identity, world purpose, and required grand strategy.  A 
thorough literature review helped clarify national identity as the ideational construct used 
to justify grand strategy selection, which is discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The primary research question was “How did President Clinton define America’s 
post-Cold War national identity?”  The secondary question was “How did President 
Clinton use national identity to justify and implement his grand strategy?”  This literature 
review was designed to explore research on post-Cold War American national identity 
and its potential influence on grand strategy.  A literature review helped review ideas 
concerning post-Cold War American grand strategy.  Noted authors provided 
perspectives on important issues in American foreign policy and activity in the 
international arena.  Yet this was not just a discussion of events but the reasons, theories, 
and decisions that created events in the immediate post-Cold War American era.  The 
conceptual framework for grand strategy provided the foundation for understanding both 
the definitions and relationships of national identity and grand strategy.  
Although Carl von Clausewitz (2015) developed the concept of a national grand 
strategy, and Liddell B. H. Hart (1991) coined the term in modern international relations 
following WWII, the term often invokes a variety of unclear definitions.  Thus, clarifying 
a standard definition was important to this study.  It was also important to identify what 
researchers found to be persistent tenets of American grand strategy because tracking 
changes in those tenets from one president to the next (or within administrations) can 




I also sought to identify the various research methodologies used by scholars.  
Observing how other researchers and authors studied this topic presents various research 
methodologies and strategies that inform and focus this research effort.  Although many 
prescriptive monographs did not identify a research methodology, a strategy could often 
be gleaned from the authors’ presentation of facts and assertions, which I used to inform 
this study.  Identification of research tools, tactics, and techniques also informed this 
study either by demonstrating which produced rigorous results or what did not.  For 
example, it became clear that I would need to include a timeline of events considered 
vital to this research.  I modified President Clinton’s critical events timeline from the 
University of Virginia’s Miller Center on The Presidency, excluding domestic and non-
foreign affairs issues.  See “National Power Projection Timeline” in Appendix C. 
In addition, I sought other scholars’ characterizations of each president’s foreign 
policy in the hopes that information could help identify or explain substantive differences 
between administrations.  Lastly, I looked for new questions that would emerge from the 
literature to better guide and focus this research.  Specifically, the issue of varying 
national interests proved to be a helpful addition because that delineated and prioritized 
the major threats each president perceived and used to guide his new or adherence to a 
potentially preexisting grand strategy.  The conclusion serves both to summarize critical 
aspects of the literature review and discusses implications for this research on social 
changes. 
The Literature Search Strategy section provides an outline of the document search 
techniques and determinants used to find the best literature on post-Cold War American 
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grand strategy.  I organized the bulk of the literature reviewed chronologically because I 
observed what I think are evolutionary changes in both tone and content of American 
grand strategy as the nation traversed important periods of national development and 
world history.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, several authors attempted to 
ascertain what America’s next grand strategy would be (J. L. Gaddis, 1991; Mead, W. R., 
1993).  For instance, the attacks on September 11, 2001 triggered what G. John Ikenberry 
(2001) called a “fundamental reorientation of foreign policy” (p. 19).  However, though 
commentary on American grand strategy was plentiful, scholarly discourse analyzing 
changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy was sparse.   
The literature review then begins by exploring constructivism as a derivative of 
neo-liberalist theory, which explained the dynamics of inter-state activity through the lens 
of human cultural experience.  I explore national identity as a pivotal determinant of 
national interests, which could produce a national grand strategy.  The sitting president 
was identified as the official author of American national identity and grand strategy, 
ostensibly through the publication of the NSSs.   
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature search for this research project began at the Walden Library website 
in the policy and administration databases.  I searched the following databases: The 
Political Science Complete, Political Science Complete: A Sage Full-Text Collection, 
International Security, Homeland Security Digital Library, and Academic Search 
Complete.  I also used Google Scholar for essays and books on American grand strategy.  
However, not all databases were available or productive under specific headings, so I 
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began with political science, under which I added Academic Search Complete, e-book 
collection, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, and 
International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center.  
For all databases used, the search parameters included full text, scholarly (peer-
reviewed) journals, and the earliest publication dates were set for 1990 (after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the unofficial beginning of the end of the Cold War).  Signed during 
November 1990, the Charter of Paris served as the official Soviet declaration of 
noncompetition in the Cold War and their commitment to self-determination.  I assumed 
essays published prior to that year would not adequately address the post-Cold War era of 
American grand strategy since, at the time, no one would know the Cold War was ending.  
The search parameters were grand strategy, American grand strategy, U.S. grand 
strategy, national security strategy, American national identity, and national identity in 
the subject terms field.  I also combined identity with grand strategy.  National security 
was too broad of a term and did not produce titles specifically focusing on grand strategy, 
yet national security strategy was equated with grand strategy by the Department of 
Defense doctrine.  English was the selected language and all types of documents were 
included.  This yielded 140 results, although some were in other languages. 
To broaden the scope of this literature review, I also searched several websites of 
noted national security think tanks for publications by noted scholars.  The Council on 
Foreign Relations website and my subscription offered a few publications relevant to 
American post-Cold War grand strategy.  Considered one of the elite foreign policy 
centers in America, the Council on Foreign Relations is composed of renowned 
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practitioners and scholars on American foreign policy.  The Army War College (Strategic 
Studies Institute) and the National Defense University (Institute for National Strategic 
Studies) publications were valuable to this research because they added a military 
perspective.   
The search also included conference proceedings and video lectures.  The issue of 
American grand strategy has inspired significant academic and professional inquiries 
since the beginning of the 21st century.  Of note are the lectures by John Mearsheimer, 
Joseph Nye, and John Lewis Gaddis.  Several prominent universities have recently 
developed entire programs devoted to the study of American grand strategy.  The Brady-
Johnson Program at Yale, Duke University Grand Strategy Program, and Temple 
University’s collaboration with the Foreign Policy Research Institute on the Hertog 
Program in grand strategy.  The value these programs offered was syllabi, as a few 
publications common to two or more programs guided this research and are presented 
here.   
Several databases were more challenging to work with than others.  For example, 
EBSCO host database made it difficult to download adobe files.  Consequently, other 
databases contributed search results with abstracts that looked promising.  In addition, the 
search parameters were limited on several databases, SAGE Journals and Taylor Francis 
Online, for example.  I was unable to select “peer-reviewed” as one of the search criteria.  
Further, this research used databases provided by the Walden University Library 
and the Central Rappahannock Regional Library (librarypoint.org) in Northern Virginia.  
I requested books with prefaces that looked promising from the Central Rappahannock 
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Regional Library, as they have an extensive book loan agreement with Mary Washington 
University and George Mason University, both also located in Virginia.  The only other 
search engine used was Google Scholar, which linked to Walden University Library.  
SAGE Research Methods Online was very helpful in finding research methodology 
information.  I used the following Walden databases: ABI/INFORM Complete, 
Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (eBook collection), Homeland Security Digital 
Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and 
Government Collection, Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Premier, 
SAGE Research Methods Online, SoCINDEX with Full Text. I used the following 
Central Rappahannock Regional Library databases: Congressional Quarterly Researcher 
and JSTOR.  C-SPAN was used for video conferences and speeches, The Clinton 
Presidential Library (online), and several collegiate sources, including The Miller Center 
at the University of Virginia, The National Defense University, and The American 
Presidency Project at The University of California for speeches, transcripts, and 
documents.  I also used The National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs, 
which is located on the Homeland Security Digital Library. 
The primary search terms were American grand strategy, U.S. grand strategy, 
post-Cold War grand strategy, grand strategy, American post-Cold War national 
identity, and American national identity.  However, after reading a few essays, it became 
apparent that searching for the critical components of grand strategy might also yield 
valuable tangential information on the subject.  Adding American national interests, post-
Cold War national interests, American strategic interests, strategic narratives, and 
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presidential narratives produced useful results that provided insight into American 
strategic history.  Using these and other search terms was an iterative process. 
Finding and Sorting the Literature for Review 
Much of the literature rejected for this research offered little analytical depth or 
historical value, including the authors’ preferences for grand strategy while criticizing the 
president.  Few essays or books were the product of a scholarly research effort to identify 
and explain specific changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy.  Much of the 
literature reviewed for this research included scholarly assessments of individual 
presidential foreign policy, such as British Professor John Dumbrell’s (2005) lecture on 
the Bill Clinton foreign policy.  Individual presidential assessments helped identify 
distinct trends that may have been unique to one president or one specific period in recent 
American international history.   
As this was essentially a study of international relations, I specifically included 
non-American authors whose contributions helped broaden the perspectives on American 
grand strategy.  Dumbrell (2005), wrote from the United Kingdom, Miller (2010), writing 
from Israel, and others served that purpose well.  In international affairs, national identity 
is important, yet so is the perception from other sources in the international community.     
Theoretical Foundation 
Literature Review 
The Nature of Constructivism 
Constructivism is a state-based theory of international relationships grounded on 
the principles of human social interaction (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013; 
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Wendt, 1992).  This social theory suggests an international application of Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs (survival, safety, belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualization; 
Chadwick & May, 2003; McLeod, 2014).  However, constructivism’s principle structure 
is that states relate to other states and situations based on ideational, intersubjective, and 
socially constructed and contextual understandings, the same as individuals and groups 
(Wendt, 1992).  Therefore, the society of states is a cognitive structure of shared 
knowledge among nations and their leaders, which contributes to each state’s national 
identity. 
Constructivism stipulates that state identities are the product of both endogenous 
and external interaction in that a nation’s domestic agenda shapes its international 
character and the broader society of states projects characteristics onto each nation, 
especially at the regional level (Wendt, 1992).  How the community of nations perceive a 
specific state therefore influences that state’s perception of itself and the national interests 
that are a product of that state’s identity.  This phenomenon is especially clear in 
international forums such as regional associations and the United Nations. 
Because the nature of American democracy stipulates that the national 
government’s character is a derivative of the domestic citizens’ political character 
measured by votes, significant American cultural changes should preclude national 
adjustments in the international arena.  In terms of American grand strategy, the social 
context and state identity define national interests.   
The power of constructivist influence. The power of constructivism is its 
explanation that the society of nations resembles the group dynamics of humans; that 
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social order is an important, even pivotal causal factor of state behavior; that reality is 
normatively constructed by group participants; and that identity shapes and explains state 
behavior (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 143).  Constructivism suggests that social pressures 
such as shaming, public exaltation, and the stigmatization of sanctions force states to 
adhere to shared international values and norms (Wendt, 1992).  Therefore, the power to 
design and reinforce international norms and laws is a component of constructivism.  For 
American grand strategy, this explanation bears two important implications: whether the 
United States follows or deviates from international norms and if the United States has 
the power and influence to impose domestic norms within other states (e.g., preventing 
state-sponsored genocide), or whether the U.S. can design international norms  and 
influence other states to follow them.  Constructivism’s assumptions about structure and 
process are important precursors to this issue of creating and influencing domestic and 
international norms. 
Additionally, numerous researchers have used constructivism to examine and 
explain international relations activities in various regions.  For example, Yukawa (2017) 
used constructivism to explain the unique characteristics evident among Asian States.  
The “ASEAN Way” uses constructivism emphasis on ideational factors to validate the 
peaceful approach states’ interactions (Yukawa, 2017).  Yukawa focused on the norms 
and identities that states created which emphasized individual state tolerance of other 
regional actors’ domestic activities.   
Structure and process. Structure in international relations refers to enduring 
characteristics of the international system that do not change often, if at all, and infuse the 
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contextual nature of state activity (Wendt, 1992).  Structures are institutions and norms 
built by iterations of state interactions.  For example, realism indicates that one structural 
characteristic of the international system is its anarchic nature in that there is no world 
authority to impose order on the participants (Morgenthau, 2006).  Another realist 
example, and one adopted by constructivists, is that security is the first goal of states in a 
“self-help” system (Wendt, 1992).  Process, on the other hand, is the interaction of states 
in the international community and is concerned with how states interact (Wendt, 1992).  
Constructivism suggests that states may change their behavior based on learning and 
interacting with other states and institutions.  Further, states do learn and change in 
reaction to exogenous activity (Wendt, 1992).  Accordingly, constructivism asserts both 
processes and structures of the international system are inter-subjective.  Therefore, the 
loss of America’s international alter-ego should have produced a significant change in its 
self-perception and corresponding theory of international activity. 
The issues of structure and process are important to this research for several 
reasons.  The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the structure 
of the international system (Waltz, 1993, p. 45).  The bipolar world then became a 
unipolar world, with the United States as the sole hegemonic power (Layne, 2006, p. 5).  
National interests are the state’s international priorities which, using grand strategy, drive 
the allocation of resources and the priority of state activity (Brands, 2012).  Realists 
consider interests unchanging and uninfluenced by factors such as institutions (process) 
and the redistribution of power (structural) in the international system (Wendt, 1992).  
This prevents realists from acknowledging that national interests change over time, often 
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in response to exogenous stimuli (Wendt, 1992, p. 394).  On the other hand, 
constructivists assert national interests change based on intersubjective processes of 
identity transformation.  This point is critical to this study of grand strategy because it 
allows the capture of American national interest changes in response to known changes in 
structure (the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world) and process (the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11/01). 
Constructivist implications for grand strategy. Constructivism’s offered 
significant implications for this research on grand strategy change in the post-Cold War 
era.  First, constructivism explained national interests as defined by national identities, 
and that national identities are inter-subjective products of State-based relationships 
(Wendt, 1992).  By observing evolving identities, this research may observe changes in 
national interests and inter-State relationships.  Second, grand strategy is composed of 
prioritized national interests and the allocation of national resources to achieve those 
interests (Art, 2003).  Therefore, as national interests change based on an evolving 
identity the accompanying grand strategy should reflect those changes accordingly.  For 
this research, constructivism presented a paradigm to examine U.S. activities in the 
international arena based on changing identities that influenced national power. 
The society-of-States is a cognitive structure of shared knowledge among nations 
that contribute to each State’s national identity and ensuing their national interests are 
considered (Huntington, 2004).  Constructivism, as used in this study, examined State-
based activity based on ideational and social characteristics (Wendt, 1992).  Therefore, 
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national identity was an ideational construct of a social position and purpose in the 
international arena. 
Additionally, as grand strategy is the planned use of national power to achieve 
national interests, the value of several  power dimensions can be explained through 
constructivist theory.  Joseph Nye’s (2010) TED Talk posited that America’s “soft 
power” is by far the more effective power dimension for a multi-polar world.  Nye’s 
assertion is predicated on the attraction of independent nations in a multi-polar world, 
where there are competing centers of influence across different power dimensions.  Nye 
also posits that attracting nations to America’s banner through soft power issues like 
common values, reduces the number of states who might compete with U.S. interests in 
various regions.  Attracting friends is much easier than defeating adversaries.  Soft 
power’s primacy reinforces the use of constructivism as a research paradigm. 
Constructivism and American grand strategy. The ability to design and 
reinforce global norms and laws is a critical component of constructivism.  Since WWII, 
America has significantly influenced the international agenda, norms, and laws; and, as 
one of the bipolar hegemonic powers, assumed the role of global policeman by 
reinforcing those norms and leading ad hoc coalitions to punish rogue actors.  Wendt 
(1992) stipulates social identities determine national interests and roles in the global 
arena (p. 438).  As the author of the modern international system, the U.S. was 
exceptionally positioned to influence its evolution through its grand strategy. 
Katzenstein (1996) edited a 13-essay book examining normative influences on 
national security, including national identity.  The authors examined how social science 
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tenets inform State activity.  National identity was explained as the social construct of 
national leaders, often using narratives to communicate and inspire popular support 
(Huntington, 2006; Katzenstein, 1996; Krebs, 2015).  While liberalism is a broad 
normative approach to international relations, constructivism specifically focuses on 
social constructs among nations, which include national identity’s influence on State 
activity. Dueck (2006), Huntington (2006), Jervis (2010), and others, used constructivism 
to explain American national identity and the influence of strategic culture on American 
interests and national power use. 
The use of constructivism in international relations. Constructivism is a 
relatively new theory within the spectrum of international relations.  According to 
constructivism, the reward of inclusion and the consequence of exclusion are important 
stimuli for States (Wendt, 1992).  For example, although the “Group of Seven” (G7) was 
formed from the most influential economic powers in the early 1970’s, Russia was not 
“elevated” to the group until 1998, when their democratic transition was firmly 
established and consequently rewarded.  President Bill Clinton urged Russia’s inclusion 
into the group, which both rewarded Russian democratic growth and reinforced American 
leadership in the forum, making it the “G8” (Laub, 2014).   
Conversely, to “punish” Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, President 
George W. Bush considered removing them from the G8 (Laub, 2014).  Russia’s 2013 
annexation of Crimea prompted the G8 to cancel the 2014 meeting of the group, slated to 
be held in Russia, and actually “suspended” Russian membership (Acosta, 2014).  This 
converted the G8 back to the G7.  Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif 
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(2015) confirmed another powerful example of the constructivist assumptions about 
inclusion during an interview with Charlie Rose.  Zarif explained the reason Iranians 
wanted to approve the pending nuclear deal with the P5+1 (U.K., U.S., Germany, France, 
Russia, and China) was not because of sanctions pressure, but because Iranians wanted to 
rejoin the community of nations without the stigma of sanctions. 
Review of Identity Theory 
Wendt (1992) explained identity theory as the perception of one’s place in the 
society-of-States and the role-specific expectations that are the product of collective 
understanding (p. 397).  Consequently,  social constructivist theory broadly assumes 
people and States may have multiple identities in different social settings.  For example, a 
State may project a mentor identity with the role of revisionist in third world settings by 
promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law through various aid programs.  
That same state may project an elitist identity with a status-quo enforcing role in Eastern 
Europe by defending existing State borders through the threat of force, sanctions,  or the 
organization of coalitions against the aggressor State.  Therefore, the role the U.S. sees 
itself assuming in the international system influences the decision-making system its 
leaders employ to gauge national interests and the resources and actions to promote those 
same interests.   
Using constructivism, Huntington (1997) analyzed American national identity, its 
national interest products, and explained historical identity changes that may influence 
post-Cold War grand strategy.  Huntington diagnosed trends during the 1990’s in the 
international environment, such as the “clash of civilizations” and the resulting conflicts 
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within and between societies, a resurgence of power politics, and the conflicting global 
pressures of fragmentation and convergence (p. 28).  Huntington added the technological, 
social, and demographic shifts in American society at the close of the Cold War and the 
twentieth century forced a redefinition of American national identity.  He identified the 
“confused” nature of the various debates on U.S. national interests during this period, as 
well as the unifying effect the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks had on national 
identity and interests of the U.S. (p. 8). 
Domestically, and speaking in cultural evolutionary terms, Huntington (1997) 
noted early American identity as the product of primarily Protestant British and Northern 
European traditions.  These foundational principles of capitalism, limited government, 
and the individual’s freedoms and role in society created the enduring core American 
culture, and national and international identity.  Huntington also reiterated Michael 
Lind’s four phases of American cultural evolution: Anglo-American (1789-1861), Euro-
American (1875-1957), Multicultural America (1972-1996), and the fourth period 
includes resolutions of various socio-economic divisions and power sharing conflicts in 
21st century American society.   
Huntington (1997) directly linked the American cultural evolution from the 
colonial period to the end of the modern era to corresponding foreign policy changes 
because dominant political demographics evolved and influenced the progression and 
balance of isolationism and internationalism.  However, Huntington also noted the 
demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War deprived the American national 
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identity of its self-defining “national cause”, which galvanized national and international 
support for the “Containment” grand strategy for nearly 50 years. 
The Global War on Terror may have initially replaced the Cold War as America’s 
raison d’être.  Dueck (2006) explained the attacks on 9/11 may have primed America’s 
strategic cultural identity to reinvigorate hegemonic tenets of American grand strategy 
that were dormant and unprovoked during the 1990s.  Dueck also confirmed the causal 
relationship between cultural influences and foreign policy and validated the use of 
constructivism as a paradigm for measuring potential changes in American grand strategy 
(p. 14). 
Additionally, Wendt (1992) posited that State identities promote national interests 
(p. 399).  While Wendt, and other liberal constructivists, normally disagree with the 
structural influence argument of realists, here he suggests international institutions 
provide a “structure” for perceiving State identities.  The structures are the norms and 
formal rules of the institution, and when a State joins the institution, it then adopts or 
adheres to the institution’s rules.  These structures (norms and institutions) then 
contribute to both the State’s identity and a motivational force for determining State 
activities.   
In terms of this research, scholars assume America’s self-identity is defined or at 
least influenced by participation in various international organizations.  Indeed, applying 
Wendt’s (1992) assumptions that a State’s identity is influenced by organizations it joins, 
there is evidence the U.S. influences international organizations it helped create.  When 
the U.S. helped create the United Nations, significant elements of American identity were 
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written into the U.N. charter, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The 
United Nations, 2020).  Taking this one-step further, America sees itself not only as a 
follower of U.N. norms, but also as a shaper of world norms by assuming a leading role 
in creating several prominent international institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), among others. 
To further support Wendt’s (1992) theory of identity, he inserts constructivist 
theory into an example.  Wendt’s assumption that two people, representing States without 
endogenic power imperatives such as glory or conquest, meet for the first time and each 
bases its actions on the other’s actions.  While Wendt’s example further involved the 
threat of violence through signaling, and the corresponding response of self-preservation, 
he did not explain the initial threatening action.  Readers were left to assume there is fear; 
however, that was a missing component of the early scenario’s explanation (Wendt, 
1992, p. 404).  The other fault with constructivist theory is that it does not consider the 
offensive nature of States to project their own values and images onto other States 
(especially neighbors) as a matter of self-preservation. 
American National Identity and grand strategy. Huntington (2004) provided 
the lynch pin connecting national identity as a principal causal factor of grand strategy.  
During the Cold War, political ideology and the “leader of the free world” national 
identity served as the relevant impetuses for American grand strategy, with democracy 
promotion as a defining national interest (Huntington, 2004, p. 257).  However, the 
Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War removed the “other” from American 
national identity, causing national culture to replace ideological differences as the leading 
37 
 
American grand strategy characteristic.  This was reinforced by President Clinton, and 
other presidents, advocating the spread of American values around the world.  Spreading 
values as a component of American national identity in the post-Cold War era replaced 
spreading democracy as the primary definition of American Cold War grand strategy 
(Huntington, 2004). 
Robert Jervis (2010) astutely identified the influence of national identity on 
American grand strategy as expressed by presidential narratives.  He explained national 
identity as the set of group attributes, values, and practices which members think best 
describe and differentiate their State from others (Jervis, 2010, p. 22).  Jervis also 
emphasized the importance of differentiation, as national identity critically used to 
include States with similar attributes (allies) and exclude States that differ from us on 
pivotal issues (adversaries), such as being a representative democracy.  For this research, 
Jervis (2010) and Huntington (2006) add important parameters for explaining national 
identity: it explains “who we are” and what cultural characteristics describe America.  An 
important modern example was given in President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 state of the union 
(SOTU) speech, when he explained “We must act in a way that is true to what we are… 
the very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights” 
(Carter, 1978). 
Eyre and Suchman (1996) used constructivism to explain conventional arms 
proliferation among Third World nations.  Leaders’ desire to improve their fledgling 
nation’s “status” provoked regional arms races among impoverished and newly 
independent countries during the post-Colonial era.  Projecting Eyre and Suchman’s 
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(1996) use of constructivism to current situations on the Korean peninsula, the same 
explanation could be made for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s ongoing quest for 
nuclear weapons and the prominence it could afford him as Asia’s second “nuclear 
power”.   
The social construction of Russia’s resurgence. “The Social Construction of 
Russia’s Resurgence” (Clunan, 2009) uses social identity at the national level and 
international relations theory to analyze how Russian elites used popular and historical 
“national interests” to shape Russia’s 21st century identity.  The sudden demise of the 
Soviet Union and the rebirth of Russia offered international relations researchers as close 
to a “natural” identity development experiment as one could expect (Clunan, 2009).  
Russian political elites specifically crafted parts of the nation’s new identity to retain its 
certain elements of the country’s historical prowess. 
Russia’s Cold War identity existed in the collective and dominant characteristics 
of its people because, even though the Soviet Union ceased to exist at the end of 1991, 
the history and legacy of the Russian people proved an enduring national phenomenon.  
However, Russian policy elites saw a unique opportunity to redefine the nation’s concept 
of self and purpose as both a domestic vision and international aspirations.  This is the 
premise of my research, that American political leaders interpret and define national 
identity as the determining factor for grand strategy. 
Contextually, Russian resurgence occurred in the era of limited national economic 
and military power, globalization, the birth of the internet, and the expansion of 
international terrorism.  Additionally, Russian leaders had to design their national identity 
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in terms of its relationship with the U.S. and Western Europe because these represented 
the dominant powers in the international arena.  A revanchist approach to Russian 
identity would likely result in a new Cold War.  Developing a Western-oriented identity 
would likely lead to increased international collaboration, especially on security and 
economic issues.  Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia, and 2014 annexation of Crimea 
(Simpson, 2014) can be considered evidence of the grand strategy born of the new 
Russian identity. 
Russia’s geopolitical history and economics almost guaranteed that whatever or 
whoever the nation became it would significantly influence the global arena, especially in 
terms of security and cooperation.  The Russian domestic debate centered on two pivotal 
questions: “What is Russia? and What does Russia do? (sic)” (Clunan, 2009, p. 2).  In 
fact, the processes demonstrated that Russian leaders debated limiting the influence of the 
need for international grandeur redefining “Stateliness” for the 21st century.  Clearly, the 
identity question precedes and determines the question of national purpose.  National 
purpose determines national interests, the founding components of grand strategy.   
Clunan (2009) directly States that national identity defines a nation’s foreign 
policy directions.  Clunan also introduces “aspirational” constructivism as a modified 
approach to international relations that focuses on social psychology and social identity 
theory as the origin of national identity.  While my research uses the traditional 
constructivist approach to international relations, it is noteworthy and encouraging to 
observe the scientific study of international relations growing.  Additionally, Clunan’s 
work relies heavily on social psychology; my research focuses on the international 
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relations theory aspect of the equation, specifically grand strategy as the actualization of 
national interests.  
Review of Grand Strategy 
This section introduced and defined the concept of grand strategy and its modern 
use by the United States to organize national interests and guide the use of national 
resources for strategic international objectives.  The conceptual basis for this research 
began with a discussion of grand strategy’s definition, its components, and the influence 
of national identity on national interests.    
First, grand strategy is about identifying and prioritizing national interests (Metz, 
2010).  Secondly, a grand strategy identifies, prioritizes, and allocates resources against 
the principle threats to those national interests.  The third function of grand strategy is to 
provide subordinate leaders the broad guidance they need to execute their specific 
national power paradigms (diplomatic, information, military, economic) to achieve 
American foreign policy goals (Brands, 2014).  Finally, published grand strategy (here, 
through Clinton’s NSSs) is a national communication: proposed domestically to political 
stakeholders, projected internationally to allies and adversaries.  It informs allies of 
national priorities and goals, and alerts adversaries to activities and national interests the 
administration may challenge. 
The architect of modern “grand strategy”, British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart 
(1991), adopted Clausewitz’s explanation of strategy, while noting the administrative 
discrepancy between “strategy” and “policy” (Hart B. H., 1991).  Clausewitz defined 
tactics as the movements to win battles, and that strategy was the vision that won 
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campaigns and wars (Mead W. R., Power, Terror, Peace, and War America's Grand 
Strategy in a World at Risk, 2004, p. 13).  Clausewitz identified grand strategy as the 
province of kings and prime ministers because it determined which wars to fight and the 
political goals those wars should achieve (Mead, 2004, p. 13).  Hart also considered the 
application of Clausewitz’s definition of strategy too narrow, focused only on wartime 
activity for the dual purposes of military victory and the parameters of the ensuing peace.   
Hart (1991) expanded Clausewitz’s philosophy of grand strategy to encompass 
perennial State-based activity in the normal pursuit of various national goals in the 
international arena, such as national security.  Liddell Hart also identified grand strategy 
as the highest form of Statecraft, using all the tools of national power to secure 
international objectives (Hart, 1991, p. 322).  In his book Strategy (1991), Hart not only 
provided maxims for national strategy planning and execution, but also appeared to be 
the earliest author to associate the phrase “ends and means” in explaining national 
security objectives and the grand strategy to achieve them (p. 335).  Hart’s vision of 
grand strategy clearly incorporated national elements of power coordinated for political 
ends.  However, many authors do not converge on a single grand strategy definition, 
which is why I address that issue below.  For additional measures of national security 
analysis, see Appendix C. 
Defining grand strategy. From the very narrow perspectives and uses, to the 
broadly theoretical and abstract, grand strategy is often characterized as a nebulous 
concept (Committee, 2008).  Several authors offered divergent definitions and purposes 
for grand strategy.  These views ranged from strictly military policy confined to wartime 
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operations, to the composite interests and goals of a nation in both peace and war.  There 
also seemed to be a discrepancy in the priority of grand strategy to foreign policy.  
Considered by many to be the father of modern strategy, Prussian General Carl Von 
Clausewitz identified State-based strategy as the woven strands of national power to 
pursue political purpose and accomplish the highest national security objectives (Von 
Clausewitz, 2015).  That comprehensive perspective was supported by B. Liddell Hart 
(1991). 
Art (2003) agreed with the majority of authors that grand strategy identifies and 
prioritizes a nation’s international goals, but stipulated the only national resource grand 
strategy uses is military power.  Art posited foreign policy was the broader phenomenon 
that coordinated all the elements of national power: DIME (p. 2).  Other authors also 
favored the military perspective to define grand strategy.  Brimley (2008) equated grand 
strategy with the military phrase “commander’s intent”, where the leader identifies his 
priorities, the contextual factors, and the mission’s goals, albeit at the national level for 
international goals.  Mearsheimer (2011) explained grand strategy as the process of 
militarily securing regions of the world valuable to American economic security (Europe, 
North East Asia, and the Persian Gulf). 
Emphasizing the broader perspective, several authors offered more 
comprehensive grand strategy definitions.  Brands (2014), Layne (2006), Kennedy 
(1991), Payne (2012), and others held the exact opposite view to Art (2003), that grand 
strategy is “the highest form of Statecraft” (Brands, 2014, p. 1).  Brands’ case study 
delineated the ambiguous and “slippery” concept and defined grand strategy as the 
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“intellectual architecture” that provides organization and structure to a nation’s foreign 
policy (p. 1).  Kennedy (1991) also emphasized the broader use of grand strategy, 
incorporating the hard elements of national power: the military, economic, and political.  
Grand strategy, Kennedy proclaimed, provides the critical link between near term actions 
and long-term national interests and goals, without the military emphasis.  Notably, 
Payne’s explanation offered no emphasis on military aspects of grand strategy.  
The grand strategy authors. Gray (2011) identified the U.S. president as the 
author of American grand strategy.  This occurs primarily through the publication of the 
NSS, with incremental adjustments and clarifications made through public speeches, 
administration press releases, and official pronouncements that help to clarify emerging 
national interests.  While Gray’s perspective explains the president’s unique role in 
designing the nation’s grand strategy, it presents a possible explanation for continuity in 
the Cold War grand strategy of “Containment”.  If each of the presidents held 
synonymous views of the priority of international threats and courses of action to 
alleviate those threats, that would explain how “Containment” was supported by 
successive American presidents, even across four decades of oscillating political parties.   
The erratic threat levels in the post-Cold War period may also have influenced 
each president’s perception of the need for a particular and continuous grand strategy, or, 
as Kissinger (2001) explained of Clinton, a president could decide there was no need for 
a grand strategy at all.  Gray’s (2011) explanation may also offer insight into how and 
why American post-Cold War grand strategy may have changed in response to the 
evolving international threat levels.  Gray explained that erratic threat levels and types 
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prevented the U.S. from developing a mature grand strategy in the post-Cold War era.  
He asserted the international threats changed significantly with the demise of the Soviet 
Union under Bush I and the Clinton era saw a relatively benign, if evolving, threat 
atmosphere, notwithstanding the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and African embassies.  
However, hard and tumultuous attacks on September 11th under “Bush II” followed by a 
lower level but persistent threat scenario under Obama produced an evolving approach 
that was not yet fully developed into a mature and specific strategy. 
The use of grand strategy by States is also a point of contention.  A generous 
reading of Thucydides’ (trans. 1956) account of the Peloponnesian War suggests he 
thought grand strategies were available only to leaders of large and powerful city-States.  
Thucydides asserted larger city-States could plan their expeditions (grand strategy), but 
the smaller and weaker States’ leaders were often at the mercy of their dominating 
neighbors and perpetually reactive (Thucydides, 1956, p. 29).  Thucydides (1956) 
suggested smaller States’ leaders’ grand strategy options were limited to collective 
security through city-State coalitions in the hopes that their combined strength would 
prevent more powerful States from attacking coalition members (p. 203). 
Grand strategy tenets. A nation’s grand strategy is the guiding paradigm through 
which it prioritizes national interests, allocates national resources against those interests, 
and determines the intellectual architecture that guides its policies, actions, and reactions 
to the myriad events and situations in the international arena (J. L. Gaddis, 2002).  
Historically speaking, Paul Miller (2012) identified five perpetual tenets of American 
grand strategy: homeland defense, promoting the democratic peace, maintaining a 
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favorable balance of power, the correction of rogue States, and the promotion of ally 
capabilities and good governance around the world (p. 7).  Ikenberry (2001) offered 
similar but broader principles of American grand strategy since the nation’s founding.  
Ikenberry suggested cooperative security and the promotion of liberalism and capitalism 
around the world are what traditionally drive American grand strategy.  Coincidentally, 
cooperative security, the promotion of liberalism, and capitalist cooperation around the 
world were products of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt’s Atlantic 
Charter (1941).  Professor Jonathan Monten (2005) agreed with Ikenberry on the 
theoretical level, that liberalist tendencies have shaped American grand strategy.  Ben 
Miller, (2010) concurred with the liberalist tradition, and added the promotion of human 
rights, democracy, and free trade.  It appears 20th century American grand strategy and 
the U.S.’s support for the 1948 publication of the United Nations Declarations of Human 
Rights (UNDHR) influenced Miller’s assertions. 
What was interesting was that each of these broad, theoretical, and specific tenets 
of American grand strategy may be considered true and accurate descriptions albeit at 
different intervals in American history.  The U.S. has consistently promoted human rights 
around the world since WWI, yet notably supported authoritarian regimes with 
horrendous human rights records when it was politically expedient during the Cold War.  
Although Ikenberry’s (2001) and Miller’s (2012) assumptions about American grand 
strategy were not mutually exclusive, there appeared to be an oscillation in the emphasis 
of evolving national interests that grand strategy is used to accomplish.  This may 
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account for the variations in perception, characterization, and even the perceived lack of 
grand strategy. 
Defining national interests. One of the key components of grand strategy 
research is the identification and prioritization of the national interests (Yetiv, 2008).  
Although many politicians and pundits proclaim their description of American national 
interests to be the purest, in terms of grand strategy, the sitting president is, in my 
opinion, the primary author of those interests by virtue of his authority to determine 
national security objectives and the allocation of national resources against those 
objectives.  I deduced this opinion based on the president’s authority outlined in Article II 
of the U.S. Constitution.  Additionally, President Clinton’s national security strategies 
published his national and international priorities, which in turn, guided U.S. policy 
during his term.  Because national interests are often defined in terms of both domestic 
and international threats and opportunities, the identified national interests may change 
between presidents and even during a presidential administration.  In advocating for a 
particular grand strategy, democratically elected presidents are compelled to publish their 
assessments of American national interests in order to garner public support their 
strategic goals. 
Numerous authors proclaimed a few national interests as “foundational” for 
modern American grand strategy.  Liberalism is one of America’s most enduring national 
interests, prevalent in the international preferences of America’s founding fathers 
(Ikenberry, 2001; Miller, 2010; Monten, 2005).  Walt (2005) stipulated the promotion of 
peace and prosperity were cornerstones of the Great Republic since its founding.  While 
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many early American presidents advocated liberalist tenets in their international policies, 
supporting the growth of democratic governments around the world became an enduring 
national interest after WWII. 
The Department of Defense dictionary (2015) defined national interests as the 
“foundation” for national security goals (p. 165).  While it did not mention grand 
strategy, the dictionary also defined NSS as the president’s publication that organized 
instruments of national power to obtain national goals and contribute to national security 
(p. 165).  Metz (2010) and Wormley (2009) correlated American grand strategy with the 
president’s published NSS.  The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required sitting presidents 
to annually submit their national security strategies to Congress.  Wormley (2009) 
analyzed the national security strategies from 1986 to 2006 to analyze continuity in their 
“ends”, the president’s articulation of national interests.  He identified four “enduring” 
national interests: 1) physical security of the continental U.S., 2) protecting the global 
economy, 3) promoting the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights, and 
4) cooperative security through strategic alliances (Wormley, 2009, p. 2). 
To many students of foreign policy, geopolitics was proven a cornerstone of 
international relations.  Toward that end, understanding specific regions of the world that 
have proven themselves of concern to the U.S. helped further clarify national interests.  
The regions where the U.S. consistently focused in the modern era were Western Europe, 
the Middle East, and East Asia (Layne, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001).  These areas were 
perpetually identified as vital to U.S. national interests for political and economic security 
(Art, 1999; Brands, 2014; Miller, 2010).  Conversely, Africa and Latin America have 
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only proven to be peripheral interests to American foreign policy and did not 
significantly impact the development or implementation of American grand strategy 
during President Clinton’s tenure. 
 
Variations of American grand strategy. Various authors addressed several 
variations in American grand strategy, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold 
War period.  Although J. L. Gaddis (1982) determined “Containment” to be America’s 
Cold War grand strategy, he also observed strategic variations across administrations 
within the broader “Containment” strategy.  A few authors touched on the ideological 
foundations of American grand strategy, instead favoring the strong influence of evolving 
threats and opportunities within the strategic environment. 
Boyle (2008) and Walt (2005) suggested the U.S. has long used a combination of 
offshore balancing in the Middle East and Europe, and Selective Engagement elsewhere.  
Brands (2014) asserted a more complex view.  He said every State has a grand strategy 
because leaders make decisions based on national priorities (p. 6).  Brands, Ikenberry 
(2001), Kissinger (2001), and Mearsheimer (2011) all characterized American grand 
strategy under Clinton as unsynchronized, eclectic, or ad hoc.  Under Bush II, Brands 
observed an initial dovish approach to primacy that yielded quickly to the rise of a 
hegemonic strategy after 9/11.  Agreeing with Brands (2016), J. L. Gaddis (2009) 
described a lack of strategic coherency in the Bush I and Clinton administrations.  J. L. 
Gaddis (2009) suggested national catastrophes and wars force States to actually choose a 
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grand strategy, resulting in the increased focus of the Bush II administration after the 
attacks on September 11th and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
Conversely, Layne (2006), and Mead (2004) found strands of grand strategy 
continuity running from the end of WWII through their dates of publication.  However, 
Layne characterized American grand strategy as traditionally extra-regional hegemony.  
Mead asserted American grand strategy was based on global hegemony, especially after 
9/11.  Schwenninger (2003) agreed with Mead but introduced a new term “muscular 
dominance” for the post 9/11 period.  Mearsheimer’s (2001) earlier work depicted 
American grand strategy as offshore balancing, but not hegemonic (p. 261).  Payne 
(2012) found America did have a post-Cold War grand strategy, but identified it as 
cooperative security without the hegemonic tone of the previous Cold War era. 
Modern American ideological traditions. Miller’s essay “Explaining Changes 
in U.S. Grand Strategy” (2010) asserted that regardless of the methods, American grand 
strategy has consistently had the same liberalist objectives: the expansion of free trade 
and the spread of democracy and human rights.  Chris Layne (2006) also discussed the 
liberalist traditions of American grand strategy, dating back to the nation’s founding, for 
two reasons.  Layne first asserted America’s best strategy for security was the creation of 
like-minded capitalist democracies abroad (p. 118).  Additionally, Layne stipulated that 
American security and prosperity were based on the Open-Door policy of international 
trade since the early days of the republic (p. 120).   
Miller (2010) conjugated liberalism and realism into offensive and defensive 
versions to explain long-term ideological trends in U.S. grand strategy.  Using these four 
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created paradigms (offense or defensive liberalism, offensive or defensive realism), 
Miller asserted U.S. grand strategy followed an offensive or defensive liberalist trend in 
methods at least since President Woodrow Wilson and continues today (p. 562).  For 
example, Miller’s “offensive liberalism” explained President George W. Bush’s 2003 
invasion of Iraq because he used force to democratize the country.  This assertion ignores 
the preliminary “weapons of mass destruction” reasons for the invasion, so the point is 
not well-proven by his example.  Miller’s offensive realism equates to Kissinger’s (2003) 
neo-realism as they both advocate U.S. military hegemony as the ideational premise for 
American security and world peace.  Historically, Miller posited the end of the Cold War 
allowed the U.S. to shift from a realist paradigm (due to the benign international 
environment and the loss of great power challengers) to a liberalist-based grand strategy 
(p. 27). 
Layne (2006) contrasts Miller (2010) by focusing only on the offensive and 
defensive realist patterns of American Cold War and post-Cold War grand strategy 
traditions.  Layne asserted that primacy-based or hegemonic grand strategies inevitably 
lead to strategic over-commitment and are therefore inherently self-defeating.  John 
Mearsheimer (2001) explained the benefits of offensive realism by suggesting the 
structural constraints of the international system lead great powers to choose regional 
hegemony.  Layne and Mearsheimer raised the importance of geography in States 
selecting their grand strategies.  Mearsheimer explained continental great powers are 
prone to hegemonic grand strategies due to powerful neighbors and an insecure 
environment.  Layne accepted the U.S. did not have this concern during the post-Cold 
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War period (the 1990’s) and did not seek a hegemonic grand strategy based on offensive 
realism.  However, that assertion raises questions in light of the advance inter-State 
communications caused by globalism in the post-9/11 world. 
Layne (2006) asserted offensive and defensive realism could be used as structural 
theories to gauge post-Cold War American grand strategy.  This was validated by 
Mearsheimer’s (1991) prediction the U.S. would pursue, and achieved, regional 
hegemonic grand strategy.  However, that does not provide a comprehensive 
understanding of U.S. grand strategy prior to 9/11.  In addition, Layne discounted 
Mearsheimer’s successful assertion because, aided by two “vast moats”, the U.S. had 
achieved hegemony in the Western hemisphere long before the end of the Cold War.  In 
addition, Layne asserted previous great powers failed to achieve regional hegemony in 
Europe due to both the multi-polar atmosphere and the history of counterbalancing 
against rising powers. 
Although Miller (2010) does not offer the observation, Layne (2006) asserts and 
Mearsheimer (1991) disagrees, that due to the Cold War’s swing between offensive and 
defensive realism, the U.S. did employ an extra regional hegemonic grand strategy in 
addition to “Containment”.  This is proven by the continued presence of many American 
military bases in both Europe and Asia.  During the Cold War, the choice for liberalism 
reigned when the international threats were low and the U.S. could promote other 
nations’ pluralist transitions; the choice for realism reigned during periods of high 
international threat levels, such as the Cold War (Miller, 2010).    
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Miller (2010) asserted the post-Cold War period saw the rise of American 
defensive liberalism due primarily to the absence of a competing great power and the lack 
of an international existential threat, which contributed to the lack of realist-based grand 
strategies.  America’s benign support for and promotion of democracy in Haiti and 
Kosovo, respectively, signaled a defensive rather than offensive liberalist grand strategy 
(Miller, 2010, p. 46).  The liberalist strategy also explained America’s humanitarian 
interventions under Presidents George H. W. Bush in Somalia (1992-93) and Bill Clinton 
in Haiti (1994-99), Bosnia (with NATO, 1995), and Kosovo (with NATO, 1999) 
(Frontline, 2014).  
Miller (2010) explained the rise of offensive liberalism in the post-9/11 period, 
under the President George W. Bush administration, as a defensive measure to eliminate 
the existential threat posed by Saddam Hussein and replace it with a liberal democracy 
(p. 45).  Forcible regime change, according to Miller, is a perfect example of offensive 
liberalism.  He also cited the unilateralist proclamations in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy as proof the U.S. was returning to its post-WWII hegemonic roots.   
Strategic patterns in the modern American era. Layne (2006) contends WWII 
was a pivot point in American grand strategy, producing an extra-regional primacy-
oriented grand strategy outside the Western hemisphere (p. 12).  Layne identified only 
Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia as regions of post-Cold War American 
national interest (p. 3), primarily for political and economic interests and with a strong 
concentration on the determinants of geo-politics.  America has long held a symbiotic 
relationship with Western Europe, at the time the Persian Gulf provided the world’s 
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necessary oil, and Asian trade has been a cornerstone of the U.S. Pacific strategy since 
Roosevelt’s Open-Door Policy.   
Layne’s thesis is an expansion of John Mearsheimer’s (2001) position that 
American grand strategy has been only regional hegemony, for the Western hemisphere, 
since the end of WWII.  Mearsheimer supported this claim by asserting the U.S. serves 
only as an offshore balancer for East Asia, competing with China and Russia, and in the 
Western European theatre competing only with Russia. 
In an earlier essay by Swarz and Layne (2002), they contend the U.S. post-Cold 
War grand strategy saw no major change from the previous era.  However, Swarz and 
Layne clarified the continuation of Cold War strategy to be the acceptance of a 
multipolarity field as long as the U.S. retains primacy (p. 36).  Swarz and Layne assert 
the U.S. is assertive in other regions just enough to confront competitors and regional 
disruptors, but also enough to prevent allies from feeling so insecure  they consider 
growing their own military power. This military growth, Swarz and Layne assert, could 
lead other States to reduce their U.S. dependency and become regional competitors.  
Interestingly, they suggest that although the U.S. decries NATO and the EU’s strategic 
dependence, that dependence ensures U.S. primacy because other States won’t feel 
pressured to increase their own military capabilities.   
Swarz and Layne’s (2002) argument is unfolding in Turkey during the Trump 
administration.  During the Clinton administration, the U.S. was Turkey’s primary 
military supplier (Gabelnick, Hartung, & Washburn, 1999).  However, Turkey’s 2019 
purchase of Russian air defense systems signals military growth beyond America’s 
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control and created significant tension between Turkey, NATO, and the U.S. (Team, 
2019). 
Primary grand strategy options. Although other authors delineated a more 
extensive grand strategy typology, Posen and Ross (1997) identified only four 
“competing” grand strategies for American presidents to choose: Neo-Isolationist; 
Selective Engagement; Cooperative Security; and Primacy (p. 4).  The authors detailed 
the theoretical foundations of the strategies and provided a table explaining the 
application of each strategy to current or recent international challenges the U.S. has 
faced (Posen and Ross, 1997, p. 4).  However, there is a broader and more definitive 
typology of American grand strategy choices.  Art (2003) identified eight grand strategies 
available to presidents:   
• Selective Engagement-choose specific issues/causes to engage others on.  This 
includes long-standing U.S. national interests yet suggests limited 
international activity.  This grand strategy is primarily reactive in nature. 
• Dominion/Primacy/Hegemony- “rule the world” strategy that requires 
American superiority across all dimensions of national power and all the 
regions of the world.  This grand strategy is offensive and proactive, 
suggesting the U.S. inject itself into every major international situation to 
guarantee the outcome is favorable to U.S. interests. 
• Global Collective Security- accepts American responsibility for global     
peace.  Politically unattainable, this strategy requires global consensus that is 
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nearly impossible to achieve, and collective action on major American 
initiatives. 
• Regional Collective Security- to keep the peace in selected regions around the 
world (e.g. Persian Gulf, to maintain oil flow).  Similar to Selective 
Engagement, this grand strategy identifies world regions where the U.S. 
would declare its national interests require considerable engagement on behalf 
of allies and friends. 
• Cooperative Security- reduces wars by limiting all States’ offensive military 
capabilities, comparable to the U.S.  Similar to global collective security, this 
grand strategy invites multiple treaties and security agreements around the 
world. 
• Containment- efforts to limit the capabilities and growth of a declared 
adversary, often through proxy and with direct confrontation.  Containment 
strategy may be considered a subsidiary of a comprehensive Selective 
Engagement strategy because it allows the protagonist to select when and 
where to engage to limit adversarial advancements. 
• Isolationism- to avoid most wars, maintain freedom of action.  This grand 
strategy dictates that U.S. involvement in external affairs be strictly limited to 
direct national security threats to its people or nation, and possibly its national 
interests. 
• Offshore Balancing- expanded isolationism that includes limiting rising 
Eurasian great power rivals.  This strategy requires the U.S. to accept a multi-
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polar world so it may partner with allies to solve regional problems instead of 
direct engagement in multiple locations at once. 
American post-Cold War grand strategy publications. Analyzing the literature on 
post-Cold War American grand strategy revealed a few interesting publication patterns.  
Periods of heightened interest in and increased publications on American grand strategy 
are noticeable around pivotal points in the era.  For example, following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991, several authors explored the issue of America’s role 
in the world, including future grand strategy speculations absent the Cold War nemesis of 
the Soviet Union. 
In addition, the early post-Cold War literature seemed to focus research efforts on 
the comparison of State activity and proclamations by national leaders to determine and 
validate a grand strategy designation.  However, after President George W. Bush’s 
publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the focus on grand strategy research 
seemed to shift to the culture changes in both the group of presidential advisors (neo-
conservatives) (Colodny & Shachtman, 2009). 
Similarly, President George W. Bush’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a 
resurgence of interest, essays, and analysis of American grand strategy.  Clearly, many 
authors found Bush’s declaration of unilateralism and preemptive military engagement, 
as published in his 2002 National Security Strategy, to be the codification of American 
grand strategy gone awry (Brands, 2014).  While others found strands of strategic 
continuity in Bush’s actions, but noted his “tactical failures” problematic, it appeared his 
declaration of preemptive attack was considered controversial (Mead, 2005).  The right of 
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preemption had a long-standing history in American foreign policy, Kennedy prepared to 
use it during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Reagan used it to justify invading Granada in 
1983. 
Grand strategy assessments. Whether or not American had a post-Cold War 
grand strategy, and what that strategy was during successive presidential terms proved 
the strongest points of contention in the literature.  Several noted authors declared 
American post-Cold War presidents had “no grand strategy” (Brimley, 2008; Goldgeier, 
2009; Kissinger, 2003; Suri, 2009).  Many authors declared American post-Cold War 
grand strategy alive and well, sometimes described as a “continuation” of Cold War 
grand strategy (Brands, 2014; Layne, 2006; Miller, B., 2010; Miller, P., 2010; Monten, 
2005; Payne, 2012).  Still others decried an “oscillation” between several strategies 
(Biddle, 2005, Metz, 2010).  These authors tended to deride the sitting president for lack 
of strategic continuity with America’s traditional national interests. 
American grand strategy is continuous. Several authors identified continuous 
national interests in American grand strategy.  In Peace of Illusions (2006), Professor 
Christopher Layne declared that America has a continuous grand strategy borne after 
WWII (p. 25).  Layne posited American grand strategy has been extra-regional hegemony 
and primacy both throughout the Cold War and during the post-Cold War period as well.  
Justifying this assertion in the post-Cold War period, Layne offered the Defense Planning 
Guidance (1992), written by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney and his policy 
assistant Paul Wolfowitz.  Layne focused on the document’s assertion that the U.S. 
should “maintain” hegemony by preventing aspiring national competitors, such as China.  
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One could have considered Chaney’s document “The First Draft of a (New) Grand 
Strategy” (Corporation for Public Broadcasting , 1992), however the document was 
immediately discredited by then-President George H.W. Bush.  However, Layne cited 
successive NSSs by both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations that 
stipulated the same premise of maintaining the American global leadership role and 
eliminating rising rivals. 
Miller (2012) also asserted the U.S. actually had a post-Cold War grand strategy 
and, like Layne (2006), that strategy was continuous since at least the end of World War 
II.  While Miller identified ideological continuity in American grand strategy, he does not 
name a specific grand strategy, rather national interests.  His description of homeland 
security, open door policy, economic growth, and democracy promotion as America’s 
perpetual national interests are areas of grand strategy continuity.  Miller suggested only 
the manner of grand strategy application changed after the Cold War, in response to 
changes in the threat environment.  Losing the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, 
Miller explained, allowed the U.S. to adjust its national interests and pursue a less 
“offensive” grand strategy style.   
Interestingly, Miller (2012) identified specific grand strategies, such as balancing, 
as “instruments” for the broader American grand strategy “toolbox” (p. 15).  However, 
Miller’s assertion that domestic politics and ideology do not influence a State’s grand 
strategy (p. 19), specifically contradicts Clunan (2009), Dueck (2006), and Huntington’s 
(2004) premise that changes in American cultural identity specifically influenced changes 
in American grand strategy. 
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Dueck (2006) asserted “national interests”, a critical component of grand strategy, 
are inherently cultural determinants, and therefore subject to national cultural transitions 
(p. 14).  While Dueck’s premise does not specifically eliminate external influences on 
American strategic thought, his priority is clearly domestically driven and therefore more 
reflective of national demographic and societal evolution.  Dueck disagrees with 
Mearsheimer’s (1990) and Waltz’s (Brown, 1995) premise that realist traditions decry 
multipolar international systems.  Dueck asserted the post-Cold War era would see the 
rise of other, albeit “lesser”, powers such as Japan and Germany.  American grand 
strategy, Dueck noted, would have to evolve to maintain hegemony while 
accommodating the rise of multipolarity in the international system.  It is this primacy, 
along with America’s exceptional responsibility to spread liberal democracy, which 
Dueck notes as the continuous tenets of American grand strategy, even through the 
Clinton and George W. Bush terms.   
Strategic adjustment. This research revealed that several noted national security 
authors documented American grand strategy oscillation in the post-Cold War period 
(Dueck, 2006; Kupchan, 2002; Metz, 2010).  Dr. Metz (2010) suggested that every 
nation, including America, does have a grand strategy that strategy tends to shift over 
time in response to the evolution of domestic pressures and external threats and 
opportunities (1:52).  Waltz (2002) explained that both George Bush (Gulf War) and 
Clinton (Bosnian and Serbian Interventions) acted within the guidelines of long-standing 
international security institutions, such as the U.N., used America military power 
defensively and within the framework of multilateralism.  
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Strategic drift. Several authors identified America’s apparently eclectic national 
interests and international activities as evidence of a lack of grand strategy.  Brimley and. 
Flournoy (2003) conducted a 21st century version of President Eisenhower’s 1953 
Solarium Project to analyze and determine the best grand strategy options for America in 
the post-9/11 era.  They equated the absence of a 2003 Iraq invasion strategy with an 
absence of the broader American grand strategy.  Numerous other authors also noted the 
apparent lack of an American grand strategy into which smaller actions, even wars, could 
be explained (J. L. Gaddis, 2009; Suri, 2009). 
Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), Suri (2009), and others, categorized several 
examples of American “strategic drift”.  They asserted the end of the Cold War and the 
absence of an international threat contributed to popular ambivalence concerning foreign 
policy, especially under Clinton.  That resulted in a significant drop in foreign aid during 
the 1990’s and allowed President Clinton to take an “ambivalent attitude” toward the 
requirement of a grand strategy (Brands, 2014, p. 146).  That inattentiveness led to 
critical operational failures in grand strategy: ad hoc crisis management, opaque national 
interests, a lack of interest prioritization, and the emergence of too many minor problems 
without adequate attention or discipline focused on the important issues.  Militarily, half 
measures in Somalia and Haiti, delays in the decisions to intervene in Bosnian and 
Kosovo, and undermining pro-Western Russian leaders by expanding NATO all 
contributed to the perception among scholars that the Clinton ship of State was 
strategically adrift (Biddle, 2012; Brands, 2014; Brimley, 2008; Suri, 2009; Walton, 
2012; Yetiv, 2008). 
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Strategic cultural continuity and change. The political elites who plan and 
conduct American foreign policy are critical elements of the strategy formulation and 
execution process.  In addition, people bring ideas and perceptions that may influence 
group thought and national security culture.  Jeremy Suri (2009) mentioned the 
importance of having sophisticated strategists such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, 
and Dean Acheson to organize and guide American strategic thought during the Cold 
War.  The “Wise Men” of the Cold War identified urgent threats, lucid national interests, 
and designed policies to secure interests at reasonable national costs (Suri, 2009, p. 613).  
That group preceded technocrats such Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Colin Powell.  
These like-minded national security advisors of the late-Cold War period produced and 
adhered to the flexible but rigorous policy guideline called “Containment”.  However, 
those generations of national security advisers, had largely receded from policy making 
until the George W. Bush term.  As scholars observe new generations of advisers rise, 
scholars may also note new interpretations of American national identity and the grand 
strategies that identity is likely to produce.   
The “policy elites” theory (Drezner, 2011) of continuity and change in American 
political leadership added a social dimension to the analysis of American national identity 
and grand strategy.  Corporate leaders such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul 
Wolfowitz, tried to apply a strategic framework from their Cold War era to the post-Cold 
War period in the 1994 Defense Planning Guidance (Burr, 2015).  The Defense Planning 
Guidance was intended to propose a grand strategy that would prevent the emergence of 
an international rival and define the establishment of American international hegemony 
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for the post-Cold War era (Burr, 2015).  Although President George H.W. Bush refuted 
the proposed strategy before leaving office, the same team of “Vulcans” resurrected that 
Cold War-era strategy under George W. Bush in 2002 National Security Strategy (Suri, 
2009).  This illustrated how the revolving door between corporate America and American 
political elites can influence national security theory and planning from one period to the 
next.  However, as political parties change leadership roles in government with elections, 
the party elites, their constituencies’ priorities, and corresponding policy preferences 
could change as well.  While J. L. Gaddis (1982, 2002) observed remarkable grand 
strategy consistency during the Cold War, across varying political leaderships, the post-
Cold War did not offer the political stabilizing force of an international alter-ego like the 
Soviet Union. 
Multiple grand strategies. Yetiv (2008) indirectly offered an interesting 
observation: that the U.S. may actually be employing multiple grand strategies 
simultaneously (p. 11).  This assertion assumed the U.S. could use different grand 
strategies at different times, and in response to different regional or national interest 
situations.  Yetiv’s book specifically examined U.S. grand strategy in the Persian Gulf 
from 1972 through 2005.  However, the suggestion that U.S. presidents used a variety of 
grand strategies in response to changing situations and national interests creates a third 
option for this research: that the U.S. may have been alternating between grand strategies, 
and therefore gave various observers the perception that no particular grand strategy was 
prominent or adhered to during an observation period. 
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Grand strategies and presidential doctrines. Thinking about the evolution of the 
grand strategy concept in America President Eisenhower should be credited for codifying 
the process through rigorous analysis and comparison in the Solarium Project.  It was 
President Eisenhower’s military background that inspired him to essentially conduct 
military decision-making protocols on U.S. government Statecraft.  It seems simple and 
intuitive for the national leader to test and validate his doctrine before publishing it, but in 
terms of modern American grand strategy, President Eisenhower set the example 
(Abshire, 2013). 
President Obama’s grand strategy included adherence to a broad variation of the 
Nixon Doctrine, in terms of providing military training and materiel to selected States.  
President Nixon’s “Guam Speech” formally declared America as a “Pacific Power, and 
that America would provide a nuclear shield to U.S. treaty nations while requiring the 
native military (of South Vietnam) to be the primary fighting force for the conflict 
(Woolley & Peters, 1969).  However, President Obama chose to adjust U.S. adherence to 
the unpublished Clinton Doctrine, which suggested the U.S. could and would get 
involved in any nation or region it considered necessary for national security.  The 
Clinton Doctrine also proved the precursor to part of the Bush Doctrine by declaring 
American interests were global in nature.   
The Bush (2002) Doctrine’s preemptive strike declaration was a traditional 
presumption of U.S. presidents.  Reagan used it in Grenada, George H.W. Bush in 
Somalia, Clinton in Haiti, and previous presidents in Mexico, Cuba, and the Dominican 
Republic, among other regions.  Therefore, the popular surprise at the Bush Doctrine’s 
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assertion of unilateralism was not actually all that surprising to students of American 
political history. 
Effectively managing the balance of power, vis-a-vis other allies and adversaries, 
has been one of the five pillars of American grand strategy at least since the era of 
President Theodore Roosevelt (Miller P. D., 2012, p. 7).  Noted geopolitical analyst 
Robert Kaplan explained the international center of gravity was moving away from 
Europe and to the Asian-Pacific region (Gardels, 2014). While some thought balance of 
power politics died with the rise of American unipolarity, President Obama recognized 
the issue’s resurgence with China’s rising geopolitical and economic power.  Obama’s 
intended “pivot to Asia” highlights a reorientation of American grand strategy toward the 
Pacific theater as the concentration of the 21st century’s political and economic wealth 
(Campbell & Andrews, 2013).   
Research Methodologies 
Many of the essays included in this literature review presented research 
methodologies and techniques that may inform the study of post-Cold War American 
grand strategy.  For example, Layne’s The Peace of Illusions (2006) identified four 
empirical tests he used to assess changes in grand strategy across presidential 
administrations.  First, he looked at that president’s Stated aims or goals and 
characterized that strategy according to a predetermined typology.  This also included 
ascertaining the consistency of policies during the administration.  Second, Layne asked 
if the president favored multipolarity or unilateral action.  Third, Layne asked if the 
military and broader DIME projection in the region appeared to support the broader 
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American grand strategy.  Fourth, Layne asked if the grand strategy was consistent in 
peacetime as it was during hostilities (p. 25). 
Brands’ (2014) What Good is Grand Strategy? asserted grand strategy is not 
required to be formally announced in a speech or policy letter (p. 6).  However, Brands 
also declared that because grand strategy making is an iterative process, it might be 
analyzed by observing the way a State’s leaders manage a range of international problems 
over a specific period.  Brands’ enumerated definitions of seven grand strategy 
components offer specific and observable points at which a presidential administration 
might be gauged.  Brands determined Clinton achieved some success with the modest 
expansion of NATO and free markets but failed to provide an overarching strategy.  
Similarly, he assessed George W. Bush was led by the “Hawkish Vulcans” (Cheney and 
Wolfowitz) and used the military inefficiently because he (Bush) did not theoretically 
link his activities to a higher international purpose. 
The case study research strategy. Several authors who produced research results 
used the case study research strategy.  Walton (2012) explained that case study strategy 
allowed him to categorize each president’s grand strategy for analysis and comparison.  
Walton analyzed President George W. Bush’s 2002 NSS to determine if its goals were 
clearly articulated and prioritized.  He also compared Bush’s own 2002 NSS to his 2006 
version, and declared the comparison demonstrated critical faults in both years’ 
documents which contributed to faults in national execution.  The case study approach 
allowed me to compartmentalize and analyze President Clinton’s policies to identify a 
possible cohesive and consistent strategy. 
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The Gap in the Literature 
This literature review exposed a potential gap in the published knowledge about 
the relationship between America’s evolving national identity and its influence on post-
Cold War grand strategy.  Congressional leaders and several authors expressed dismay at 
America’s lack of grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008).  Understanding 
American grand strategy in terms of national identity may explain previously unnoticed 
points of strategic continuity.   
While Huntington (2006) noted the importance of observing America’s search for 
national identity in the post-Cold War era, his research did not examine the importance of 
presidential influence on that identity or its causal influence on grand strategy.  Specific 
presidential narratives have not been examined to ascertain how they construct national 
identity or use it to justify and validate grand strategy choices.  American post-Cold War 
national identity and grand strategy are yet not fully explored.   
This study was needed to understand the connection between evolving national 
identity and its impact on grand strategy.  Additionally, by observing the president’s 
strategic narratives, speeches, and publications, I was able to ascertain how American 
national identity was constructed and presented to domestic and international audiences 
as justification for grand strategy choices in the immediate post-Cold War era.  
Additionally, because America stood with such prominence in world affairs during this 
period, the U.S.  electorate, foreign policy scholars, practitioners, and observers should 
carefully consider the national identity proffered by political leaders, and the long-term 




This literature review explained constructivism as the relevant international 
relations theory for this research because of its reliance on ideational constructs of reality.  
I explained the value of national identity as a primary causal factor for determining 
national interests and grand strategy.  This review also illuminated national identity as an 
ideational construct proffered by national leaders.  This review also clarified the president 
as the author of American national identity, often through strategic narratives, and the 
accompanying grand strategy.  Additionally, the principle tenets of American grand 
strategy, as specifically noted by Miller (2010), or ideologically explained by J. L. 
Gaddis (2002) may lend themselves to specific characteristics and qualities of national 
identity as explained by the President. 
The qualitative case study approach emerged as the best research design for this 
study.  Constructivism’s explanation of national identity as the producer of national 
interests and grand strategy ensures this design remains within logical and reproducible 
guidelines.  Clunan’s (2009) use of constructivism to delineate Russia’s resurgence 
further confirms this research designs’ generalizability.  Because the President’s 
multidimensional authority enables him to determine both national identity and grand 
strategy, the link is clearly established.  However, his communication parameters require 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the research methodology for the examination and analysis 
of national identity’s influence on post-Cold War American grand strategy during the 
Clinton administration.  I review research strategies, data acquisition and analysis 
techniques, the researcher’s role, and other relevant methodological issues.  Because the 
research purpose guided critical decisions including research dimensions, the 
methodology, strategy, and data management, the research questions influenced specific 
research characteristics.  The purpose of this research was to determine if and how 
American national identity was modified and used to validate grand strategic changes in 
the post-Cold War era.   
Research Design and Rationale  
This study was designed to clarify a post-Cold War grand strategy by observing 
America’s evolving national identity and how it influenced America’s post-Cold War 
grand strategy. Because I examined presidential and senior administration 
communications in various formats, qualitative case methodology offered the most 
appropriate normative research paradigm.  The qualitative research methodology 
provided a rich theoretical approach to understanding subjective human interaction at the 
strategic national level.  Further, because national identity is an ideationally constructed 
social phenomenon, the qualitative case study using constructivism offered the best 
approach to data acquisition and analysis.  The case study design enabled me to 
temporally bind this study to President Clinton’s two terms in office (January 20, 1993–
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January 20, 2001) and provided a finite approach to the data acquisition process.  The 
case study design is also one of the public administration traditions that incorporates 
important data types such as documents and speech analysis, which provided the bulk of 
my research sources (McNabb, 2009).  Additionally, case study research allows the 
incorporation of relevant contextual information, which helped highlight the use of 
instruments like venue and audience selection in the presentation of presidential 
pronouncements (Yin, 2006). 
There are three different types of case studies that were considered for this study: 
naturalist, positivist, and constructivist (Given, 2008, p. 69).  The primary goal of the 
naturalist case study is to produce detailed and pragmatic information on the research 
topic within the case parameters.  But aspirational constructivism was pertinent to this 
research as a strategy reliant on social psychology (Clunan, 2009).  Additionally, the 
positivist case study is focused on producing “law-like propositions” that are predictive in 
nature (Given, 2008, p. 69), which allowed this research to suggest future connections 
between national identity and grand strategy.  Further, constructivists tend to view case 
studies as a check on standing literature and a contribution to the intellectual discourse on 
the research topic (Brands, 2014).   
Other grand strategy researchers have also used the case study design.  For 
example, Layne (2006) examined the extra-regional hegemonic theory of American 
grand strategy from 1940 to 2006, connecting variables with predicted outcomes to 
ascertain whether policymakers’ actions and communications were consistent with the 
extra regional hegemony theory.  Similar to this study, Layne also examined the 
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publications and communications of U.S. policymakers to determine if they were 
consistent with the nation’s stated grand strategy.  In terms of data, Layne’s use of 
published NSSs as the codification of each president’s grand strategy also identified a 
valid normative data source for this research.  Additionally, Brands (2014), Kennedy 
(1991), and Miller (2010), among others, also used case studies to compartmentalize 
American presidential administrations and examine their use of national power to 
determine and compare respective grand strategies.  Though Miller alone introduced 
empirical variables to test deviations in political ideology, the others all used historical 
analysis to understand each president’s national interests and national power use.   
Research Questions 
RQ1: How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national 
identity? 
RQ2:  How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement 
his grand strategy? 
The Study’s Grounding Concept 
This study’s grounding concept was that every nation uses some grand strategic 
method to organize their national interests and determine how and when to use national 
resources to achieve those interests (Brands, 2014).  A state’s national identity is 
historically influenced, determines its role in the international community, and 
significantly influences its grand strategy because it informs national interests 
(Huntington, 2004).  By comparing President Clinton’s explanations of national identity 
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to the use of national power, I was able to determine a direct relationship between his 
constructed national identity and his chosen grand strategy. 
The Researcher’s Role 
The researcher is an important data instrument for qualitative research (Huberman 
& Miles, 2002).  Miles and Huberman also suggest that in qualitative studies, the 
researcher’s role in acquiring data can range from a simple, nonparticipant observer to a 
participative questioner who fully engages the subject to extract as much information as 
possible.  For this study, I objectively collected, sorted, coded, and analyzed relevant 
historical documents, speeches, videos, and publications related to post-Cold War 
American grand strategy and national identity during President Clinton’s two terms in 
office (January 1993 through January 2001).  Initially, I looked for references to human 
characteristics (e.g., “who we are as a nation”) as justification for a specific use of hard or 
soft power components. 
Another important researcher role is presenting the data and manuscript in an 
easily readable format (McNabb, 2009).  A solid research project logically organizes the 
research questions and associated data and uses road maps or guiding paragraphs to 
outline manuscript sections and major issues (Creswell, 2009, p. 83).  For this study, I 
produced a coherent and logical explanation of how President Clinton used his version of 
national identity to justify specific actions within his grand strategy.  I read all Clinton’s 
NSSs first, looking for references to grand strategy and national identity.  Specifically, I 
looked for key words and phrases in the NSSs that referred to one or more of the 
established eight possible grand strategies outlined in the literature review.  I also looked 
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for human identifiers and character traits that Clinton might have used to construct his 
version of American national identity.  I focused on Clinton’s reliance on “American 
values” as a consistent precursor to his national identity explanation. 
Methodology 
Data Management 
The nature of the research influences all aspects of data management, including 
what data types are acceptable and how they are acquired, stored, coded, and analyzed 
(Patton, 2002).  Because political science research often includes descriptive data types, 
such as speeches, essays, and human interviews, I adhered to established data coding and 
analysis techniques.  Data were stored on my home computer, which uses several Internet 
Security protocols.  Additionally, no personal data were acquired or stored for this 
research. 
There were a few steps that I followed in the data collection and analysis process. 
First, I gathered research documents, relevant essays, and speeches by policymakers and 
foreign policy intellectuals (see Creswell, 2014).  Second, case study data analysis steps 
include (a) organizing the data; (b) generating categories, themes, and patterns; (c) coding 
the data; (d) applying the ideas, themes, and categories to data; (e) searching for 
alternative explanations; and (f) preparing and presenting the report of findings (McNabb, 
2009, p. 367).  Steps (a) through (d) are iterative, and I expected at least three to five 
cycles of data analysis and organization, though I stopped counting after the ninth cycle.  
Third, by ensuring the analysis and coding process was rigorous, logical, and iterative, 
the research findings should withstand scrutiny and peer review. 
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I began the data search by looking for major international challenges during the 
Clinton administration.  I compared lists of international activities from different sources 
such as the Clinton Presidential Library, the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, 
and the Clintonwhitehouse5.gov website, which is no longer updated.  From the 
composite list, I looked for international incidents and choices that were publicly justified 
by President Clinton’s explanation of national identity or national values.  I checked the 
Miller Center’s list of President Clinton’s speeches against the Clinton Presidential 
Library’s list; however, I only researched speeches relevant to national security, and 
foreign affairs.   
President Clinton’s NSSs provided the bulk of the data for this research because 
they clearly articulated justifications for his strategic preferences.  I also compared the 
NSS explanations to the actual strategic decisions made during his tenure. I read all the 
NSSs from President Reagan’s (1987) first through President Clinton’s (2000) last.  First, 
I searched for specific national identity phrases such as “who we are,” “as a nation, we,” 
“America’s role,” and “America is.”  Because a president’s oratorical tool includes using 
human characteristics to define his version of national identity (Huntington, 2004), I also 
searched for descriptions of human values and characteristics attributed to the U.S. as a 
nation by Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton.   
Primarily in the NSSs I looked for examples of grand strategy components, of 
which there were many, including descriptions of national interests and national goals, 
explanations of when and how national power could be projected in support of goals, and 
any references to the eight standing grand strategy descriptors listed in Chapter 2.  To 
74 
 
ascertain any correlation between the results of the NSS observations and America’s use 
of national power, I compared America’s role in significant international incidents with 
the Stated policy.   
Data Types 
Qualitative case study research includes a wide variety of data types to saturate 
the study topic within the specific case boundaries (Given, 2008).  Consequently, this 
project included a variety of written and spoken word data to identify how President 
Clinton justified and explained grand strategy choices in terms of national identity.  
Speeches and publications from President Clinton, senior administration policy makers, 
national security practitioners, scholars, and think tank contributors were analyzed to 
determine their explanations and analysis of the administration’s grand strategy and the 
national identity used to justify that strategy. 
Publications and speeches are data sources with a long history in national security 
research.  For example, the National Security Directive #75, issued by President Reagan 
in 1983, identified specific goals for American policy toward the Soviet Union: 
“Containment”, the retraction of Soviet international influence, and the promotion of 
pluralist economic and political trends in Soviet elite spheres.  Additionally, the directive 
explained the diplomatic, political, military (usually through proxy), and economic means 
to achieve stated ends as negotiations, costly consequences for belligerent actions, and 
rewards for conforming to international standards (Reagan, 1983). 
This research also included primary data sources such as the direct presidential or 
senior staff pronouncements.  Using primary sources reduced the transference of bias.  
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For example, instead of researching Sciolino’s (1996) article explaining why Clinton 
changed course on intervening in Bosnia, I reviewed his 1995 Oval Office speech to the 
nation when he invoked America’s “values and interests” as the key motivator for 
international action (Clinton, 1995b). 
This research also leaned on an extensive literature base, including historical, 
modern policy, and academic-oriented documents.  I prioritized the data sources, granting 
more weight to the pronouncements from members of the National Security Council as 
opposed to others in the political arena.  The Congressional Research Service identified 
the National Security Council as a major component in formulating and often 
implementing American national security policy (Best, 2011).  Although different 
presidents reshape their National Security Council to suit personal preferences, the 
statutory members identified by the national security directive (National Security Agency 
1947) are the president, vice president, and the secretaries of defense and state. 
Because qualitative research in international relations often struggles with 
choosing relevant data, this research used data that directly supported the topic of grand 
strategy and national identity.  The primary data sets included are incidents and 
pronouncements that involved the use or direction of America’s primary sources of 
national power: DIME.  For example, where and how the president employed military 
resources to defend or promote American interests were included. 
Data Collection 
I examined presidential and senior administration speeches, pronouncements, 
publications, and other communications using qualitative case study methodology.  I used 
76 
 
C-Span, The National Defense University, The Clinton Presidential Library (online), The 
Miller Center at the University of Virginia, and The American Presidency Project at The 
University of California for presidential speeches, transcripts, documents, and The 
National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs.  Additionally, it is important for 
presidential narratives to use strict speech selection protocols.  For example, televised 
speeches that focus on foreign affairs or national security, especially when presented 
before relevant audiences should be primary sources, which excludes the bulk of 
published presidential communications (Krebs, 2015). 
Further, is is important for the political science researcher to try to compare 
similar items within the case study limits so the items reviewed have some semblance of 
situational equality and relationship (McNabb, 2009).  This highlights one of the inherent 
limitations of qualitative research in international affairs; no two contexts are exactly the 
same, so comparisons and analyses rely on the researcher’s adherence to established 
practices and data saturation.  Consequently, I focused on presidential goals, the “ends” 
of American grand strategy.  By focusing on the grand strategy ends, I reduced the 
influence of the president’s personal tendency to use one national power source (e.g., the 
military) over others, and I concentrated on enduring grand strategy aspects more likely 
to survive presidential party shifts.  No personal or confidential data were used for this 
research.  Only publicly available research was considered for data corpus. 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Understanding qualitative data is not always as simple as reading the texts of 
speeches and drawing conclusions, especially when a researcher compares data across 
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situations within the same case limits (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003).  To appreciate 
the value of the case study research strategy within the political science field, several key 
factors were incorporated into the data analysis and interpretation regime.  First, data 
points were purposefully selected to provide significant contributions to the research and 
accurately reflect the values of the case (presidential administration) it represented 
(Creswell, 2014; McNabb, 2009).  Toward that end, I endeavored to find situations where 
the president explained the use of national power as a product of his interpretation of 
national identity.  This critical aspect binds the essential elements of this project (grand 
strategy and national identity) in the constructivist research paradigm.  Published 
documents and speech transcripts were searched for reference to American national or 
cultural identity as justification for national power projection.  The type of national power 
and context within which it was used were compared to the eight established grand 
strategy types. 
Additionally, qualitative data analysis is an iterative process, allowing data 
inferences found later in the process to influence earlier data sets and inferences 
(McNabb, 2009).  There are six critical steps in qualitative data analysis that I followed 
according to McNabb (2009):  
1. Data were organized by creating folders labeled with preliminary codes based 
on the nature of the research questions and on Huntington’s (2004) 
explanation of national identity.  I looked for human characteristics used to 
explain national identity.  
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2. Categories, themes, and patterns were generated by reviewing and searching 
the data for explanations of strategic choices, national characteristics 
(especially those used to justify decisions), human values attributed to 
national identity, and grand strategy explanations. 
3. Data was coded by grouping human character descriptors, strategic choices, 
explanations of national interests and national identity.  I compared the nodes 
to determine if there was any continuity in the strategic thinking and 
explanation of strategic choices. 
4. The report hopes to show the connections between human characteristics, 
values, and national identity descriptors.  I also tried to reduce the themes to 
determine and validate the grand strategy theme that best fit the strategic 
choices President Clinton made. 
5. Alternative explanations were searched for national identity and grand 
strategy by reviewing competing newspapers and publications relevant to the 
significant strategic situations I followed.  
Data categories were initially developed based on the events’ characteristics, 
justifications for international activity, and the explanations and descriptions provided by 
policymakers.  Additionally, discourse analysis provides the important research strategy 
for deciphering narrative data sets and speeches by policymakers (Krebs, 2015; Milliken, 
1999). 
Using Krebs’ (2015) explanation of discourse analysis, I identified dominant and 
alternative political narratives on national identity as a potential causal factor of national 
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power usage.  Krebs’ explanation of identifying, comparing, and analyzing narratives 
provided an important strategy.  Milliken’s (1999) explanation of discourse productivity 
explains how dominant narrators produce what they consider logical explanations for 
action and thereby exclude alternative narratives as illogical or inconsistent with 
proposed identity (p. 229).  These guidelines established thematic assessments that 
created meaningful nodes, such as national identity, national characteristics, 
explanations for national power use. 
Data Software 
I used the Nvivo-12 data management program which provided several 
advantages.  First, I was a little familiar with the program because I used it for several 
research courses with Walden.  In addition, the program offered excellent coding 
features, including word search programs that analyzed uploaded documents for key 
words and phrases.  Since this study analyzed the text of documents and speech 
transcripts of foreign policy makers and practitioners for key words and phrases that 
explained national identity and the use of national power, the ability to scan those 
documents for similarities saved time and increased coding accuracy.  Some of these 
phrases and key words or ideas populated codes.  The initial codes used were: national 
identity, human characteristics, strategic choices, national interests, national identity, hard 
power and soft power, and grand strategy. 
Data Coding 
Pollock (2009) considered coding raw data as the “sweat equity phase” of original 
research because it involves tedious attention to detail and the listing of important 
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research variables (p. 266).  Coding strategies must be fully justified and followed if the 
research is to maintain rigor and validity.  Additionally, I used the eight established grand 
strategies identified in the literature review as initial codes for the data (Art, 2003).  The 
presidential exercise of national power in the pursuit of national interest may fit into these 
predetermined categories.   
Effectively organizing the data is the first important requirement of managing 
qualitative research (McNabb, 2009, p. 354).  Because reducing qualitative data is 
important in each of the six steps of data analysis, McNabb suggests establishing data 
categories that allow me to organize and compartmentalize information (p. 367).  
Therefore, I identify the president’s grand strategy by the characterizations associated 
with it, the references that explain the strategy, and at least two examples of how that 
grand strategy uses each type (hard or soft) of national power.  More categories of data 
may emerge as the research progresses.  Secondly, developing thematic typologies for 
data addressing national characteristics is another critical step in data management. 
McNabb (2009) explains coding as the application of meaningful identifiers to the 
data in order to extract relevant “concepts, categories, and characteristics” (p. 590).  
Krebs (2015) coded presidential narratives according to emerging themes in the speeches.  
While Krebs’ charts of word counts did not seem to influence his findings, Nvivo 
software enabled me to develop and connect themes of national characteristics and 
national power usage. 
The first iteration of my coding included reading the NSSs for recurring themes 
and dominant issues, of which there were many as the Clinton’s (1994c) first appeared to 
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be used as baseline for successive ones, with only marginal changes from 1994 through 
1997.  As themes of “democracy promotion”, national values, national identity, and the 
projection of national power emerged, I further developed nodes that offered more 
detailed descriptions of these and other themes.  Additional iterations further refined the 
original and subsequent nodes and the saturation of themes began to emerge. 
Quality Standards 
In qualitative research, the standards of quality refer to various dimensions within 
the research paradigm.  These dimensions helped ensure the selected data was directly 
related to the research topic, which contributed to the validity of the results.  In addition, 
these quality standards helped ensure the research results accurately reflected both 
research data sets and the analysis process.  I discuss validity, bias, credibility, and other 
dimensions of quality below. 
Validity, Reliability, Bias, and Ethics 
Underpinning the trustworthiness and authenticity of research findings were the 
issues of validity, reliability, and bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  Creswell (2014) 
explains content validity as the ability of the research questions to accurately measure the 
research purpose, that is, does the research question tell you what you want to know? (p. 
201).  Internal validity refers to the research design’s ability to limit alternative 
explanations.  Scholars gauge a study’s validity by the reader’s ability to check and 
confirm the accuracy of the research findings through the employment of specific and 
standardized research procedures.   
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Validity. Because the social science I research intends to make rich, descriptive, 
and causal deductions about the world; I sought to order this research with logical 
conclusions that another researcher could reasonably be expected to find.  This research 
process relied on important factors for internal validity.  First, by using publicly available 
data within specified temporal limits, I ensured any subsequent research could also access 
the same finite data population.  Second, by using frequent citations connecting critical 
data to their original sources, other researchers should be able to follow the research 
pattern with some ease, and, if they reach alternate conclusions, then determine where 
their research process deviated from mine.  Third, by searching for alternate explanations 
of national identity in public media, I was able to reduce the likelihood that other causal 
factors (e.g. an alternate national identity) influenced or better explained the use of nation 
power components during this period.  Additionally, discourse analysis techniques 
(McNabb, 2009, p. 473) enabled me to maintain experimental validity because I could 
focus on Clinton’s narratives, linguistic themes, and rhetorical organization for answers 
to the research questions.   
Reliability. A research study’s reliability and dependability refer to the degree 
other researchers can reach the same or similar findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
given the same data and research processes (Creswell, 2014).  Reporting and reconciling 
their different explanations were also be important.  Producing a rich and accurate 
description of the research topic improved the validity of this research and will help 
convince readers of the findings’ accuracy.   
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The validity and reliability strategies for this research study included triangulating 
data by determining if a two or more data sets propose the same or similar explanations 
for a specific American grand strategy.  Here, I found significant similarities between all 
of President Clinton’s seven NSSs along important dimensions.  The national interests 
expressed in the NSSs were consistent in their references to American international 
engagement and leadership, the use of national values to determine national interests, the 
use of Selected Engagement as the grand strategy and justifications for the use of national 
power.   
Another validity strategy I used was member checking, by reviewing the research 
findings with some of the assertions other scholars have made about the same topic to see 
if they reached comparable conclusions.  Samuel Huntington (2006) is often cited here.   
Another aspect of reliability involves using standard qualitative methodologies and 
refraining from unique or improvised processes that cannot be recreated by other 
researchers.  Creswell (2009) recommends these techniques help minimize reliability and 
validity concerns. 
Bias. Marshall and Rossman (2011) identify bias as the influence of a 
researcher’s personal values or individual identity on the research process (p. 96).  
Because bias can interfere with research objectivity, Marshall and Rossman suggest the 
researcher openly explain his views on the research topic so that readers may assess if or 
how the researcher’s bias may have influenced results (p. 96).  Creswell (2014) also 
explained that good research often includes researchers’ comments and interpretations on 
the subject that are shaped by his personal history, culture, gender, and other factors.  
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Personally, I may have had some professional bias toward this research because I 
was a Soldier during this period and subject to President Clinton’s grand strategy choices.  
I also observed friends who were sent to Bosnia to support America’s mission.  While I 
do not have a preference for any specific national identity or grand strategy, the topics are 
particularly and personally interesting, but not just during this period.  I have a personal 
interest in the trajectory of American national identity and grand strategy as it may evolve 
through various eras and strategic situations.  I do not think my personal experiences 
influenced this research as the volumes of data made it relatively easy to remain 
objective. 
For political science research, McNabb (2009) suggested managing bias and 
validity fully exploring alternate explanations (p. 367).  As I reach various conclusions, 
especially grand strategy clarifications, I reconsidered alternate explanations for the same 
data points.  Had I found viable alternatives, I would have included or explained them in 
my results.  I did not.  Additionally, by considering alternate possible findings, the 
researcher then improves validity by ensuring logical explanations, other than the 
research findings, are considered and weighed on their merits.  The reader has the 
opportunity to consider those alternatives and determine if they were given full 
consideration by the researcher.   
Transferability. Transferability refers to the applicability  of this research study’s 
methodology and findings to a wider variety of public policy situations without an 
abundance of qualifiers (Creswell, 2009; Marshall and Rossman, 2011; McNabb, 2009).  
Ensuring robust results descriptions helped maintain a high transferability level for this 
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study’s research findings because that showed details of the process-generated results.  
Additionally, extensive descriptions enable other scholars, researchers, and policymakers 
to analyze and understand post-Cold War influence of national identity on American 
grand strategy.  Toward that end, this study used standard public policy parameters for 
defining and analyzing data, and adheres to standard qualitative case study procedures.  
By using established qualitative research standards, I ensured a broader audience could 
find generalizability in these research findings.  Additionally, including a rich contextual 
description of the data points established clear parameters for transferability of research 
findings to similar contexts. 
There may be other important elements of this study that could be generalized to 
other case studies, with similar contextual parameters.  For example, because democratic 
societies require political leaders to compete for their positions through the voting 
process, elected leaders are compelled to explain the logic behind their strategic decisions 
in the hopes of swaying voters to at least understand if not support their decisions.  If 
those leaders’ explanations include descriptions of  national identity characteristics, 
especially involving historical references and widely shared beliefs, then these research 
parameters  may generate comparable results.  Similarly, if the elected leaders are 
compelled to produce their national security rationale for the strategic use of national 
power, to the degree that document explains their proposed grand strategy, it could fit the 
terms of this research as well. 
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Ethical Considerations and Protections 
Creswell (2009) and McNabb (2009) both suggest ethical considerations in 
scientific research refer to the researchers’ and participants’ adherence to the moral 
standards of social and professional conduct in the planning, conduct, and reporting of 
research findings.  In dissertation research, the doctoral student is primarily responsible 
for maintaining strong ethical standards.  The doctoral committee and the institutional 
review board assist the student by assessing the research process and findings to ensure 
maintenance of scientific standards.  I maintained regular contact with my dissertation 
chair had any ethical questions arose, I would have sought his advice.  No ethical issued 
emerged.   
Sample Size 
Because this project used historical data to populate the case study, the number of 
data points were uncertain at the outset, and based on several factors, such as the political 
magnitude of the event or national power exercised by the president, the activity’s 
international context, and other contextual information.  However, I endeavored to 
include at least two examples each of hard power and soft power use by the 
administration in order to provide predictable data sets and a balanced understanding of 
identity’s influence on grand strategy choices.  The quantity or size of the power 
projection activity considered, and the way the projection is explained by the policy 
maker, influenced this data set.  If the two data points had not represented clear identity 
connections, I would have sought a third or fourth data point to better saturate the 
research.   
87 
 
In Beasley’s (2004, p. 149) book on presidential rhetoric and American national 
identity, she explained that her primary data sources were presidential inaugural 
addresses and SOTU addresses because they afforded the presidents heightened public 
image, formal and ritualistic atmosphere, and an unfettered political forum for discourse.  
This research also closely reviewed these data sources; however, I found the NSSs more 
productive because they specifically included grand strategy tenets and addressed the 
strategic use of national power paradigms in context.  Additionally, while the SOTU 
messages ritualistically included an automatic rebuttal from the opposing political party,   
The actual data sources for this research included the NSSs from 1987 through 
2000, including the first ones published, by President Reagan, as prescribed by the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act.  President Clinton’s speeches, especially SOTU addresses, were 
a valuable source for this research.  Numerous books and peer-reviewed essays on 
American grand strategy, national identity, and the international relations of the Clinton 
era were also very useful.  The New York Times and Chicago Tribune were searched for 
confirmation and contention of Clinton’s proposed national identity during this period. 
Summary 
This research study of America’s evolving national identity influence on post-
Cold War grand strategy used a constructivist case study strategy to ascertain how 
President Clinton and his administration characterized and justified national power usage. 
I have shown how the research question determined the qualitative methodology as the 
most appropriate research framework, and how the case study design offers the best 
parameters for this public policy research topic.   
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The case study design and research software enabled me to manage available data 
sources, such as documents, speeches, and other sources to compare descriptions of 
national identity to the use of specific forms of national power.  In addition, the 
qualitative methodology allows me as the researcher to become an integral data 
acquisition tool through the selection of rich and accurate data points while discarding 
fewer valuable data.  I identified critical issues, such as validity, reliability, and bias, 
among others, and mitigated and managed them effectively.  I established data 
management priorities according to their proximity to grand strategy design, operation, 
and analysis.  The results of this study may provide valuable information for U.S. 
government policy makers to better assess and guide America’s use of its national power 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
In this study, I examined American post-Cold War national identity and its 
influence on foreign policy.  The research questions posed in this study were “How did 
America’s evolving national identity influence its post-Cold War grand strategy? and 
“How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national identity as a 
justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American 
values?”  The data showed that President Clinton defined and pursued a national security 
policy founded on the cultural values he defined as American national identity.  That 
identity determined American national interests, the selection of activities to engage, and 
the national power resources to achieve strategic ends.     
Data Management 
Organizing data required creating and associating categories for information that 
contributed to answering the research questions.  I created themed categories, such as 
hard power and soft power (Nye, 2009), for data that fit each description.  For example, 
hard power related to data that demonstrated Clinton’s use of either military or economic 
resources to achieve a specific national security goal.  Similarly, soft power related to 
data that used diplomacy, information, and organizations to achieve results.   
The presidential speeches, national security strategies, and other (declassified) 
national security archives were uploaded to the NVivo-12 research program.  Primary 
nodes for hard power, soft power, cultural and national values, grand strategy 
determinations, and national interests were created with secondary nodes for goals, 
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collective action, and national characteristics, among others, were used to further refine 
the primary nodes.  As significant words and phrases emerged (see the following 
section), they were identified across several national security strategies and speeches, 
helping establish continuity for the topics they described.  For example, “values” was 
regularly prefaced by “human,” “national,” and “American” in describing the importance 
for international activity.  This research uses direct quotes more than would ordinarily be 
expected in post-graduate work because the speakers’ actual words significantly 
contributed to the topic’s description, comparison, and the speakers’ intent. 
Data Analysis 
Word search strategies were focused on several standard qualitative processes: 
word frequency, indigenous word sequences (specific to national security and 
international relations), and key words-in-context (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2009).  Key search terms and phrases included who we are; 
what we stand for, national identity, national interest, culture values, national security, 
and ideals.  Key words-in-context showed a frequent reference to “values” as American 
values, democratic values, human or universal values.  “Ideals” was frequently prefaced 
by democratic, specifically associating individual freedoms, pluralist government, and 
capitalism as component definitions.  Principal national security goals were also routinely 
grouped in the typical sequence of security, economic prosperity, and democracy 
promotion.  The primary national “assets” were explained as military strength, economic 
prosperity, and strong national ideals of human and democratic rights and the 
attractiveness of American culture (Art, 2003; J. L. Gaddis, 2002).  Clinton used the word 
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values 231 times in seven NSSs, often in conjunction with American values, national 
values, “our” values, common values, social values, shared values, or democratic values.  
The frequency of this term was important because it was often used as explanation or 
justification for Clinton’s proposed policy agenda without delineating any specific value 
or characteristic.  The key word frequency chart is at Appendix B. 
In reviewing the Republican rebuttals to Clinton’s eight SOTU addresses, the 
opportunity for the opposition party to offer alternative identity characteristics, I found 
only common references to conservative values of fiscal discipline, individual freedom, 
limited government, and strong security protocols.  The University of Virginia Miller 
Center’s “Clinton Key-events Timeline” was also used for tracking international 
activities during this administration.  Additionally, I used the dates of key and potentially 
contentious events (plus 5 calendar days) to search for editorials in the New York Times 
and Chicago Tribune on their support or dissent for Clinton’s narrative of American 
identity. 
Coding and themes. Numerous codes emerged through iterations of document 
analysis.  President Clinton’s speeches were organized by venue.  The annual SOTU 
speeches were useful in identifying Clinton’s long-term strategic goals but were 
distinguished from the event or situation-oriented speeches.  The NSSs were categorized 
by publication year, including from the Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
Bush administrations, for comparison.  Nodes for hard power and soft power were 
created then subdivided into diplomatic or information and economic or military.  
National interest nodes were created to capture descriptions of policy objectives.  
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National interests were subdivided into goals and opportunity, along with specific 
country or region oriented, such as Bosnia or Haiti, for example. The national identity 
node was divided into characteristics, producing 40 references in seven files, and values, 
with 11 references in six files. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
I established trustworthiness primarily through publicly available data and 
standard data analysis software.  Credibility and dependability were supported by well-
established data sources.  The University of Virginia’s Miller Center provided the bulk of 
President Clinton’s speeches, and I found their chart of major national activities useful 
for calculating the use of national power.  The NSSs were drawn from the National 
Security Archive, which is published by the executive branch of the U.S. government.  
The NSS reports are published to provide comprehensive articulation of American 
national interests, objectives, and goals.  The National Security Strategy Archives is 
managed by a nonpartisan national security consulting firm called The Taylor Group.  
Credibility was also maintained by using documents from the Clinton Library, especially 
declassified documents that explained background information on such topics as the 
engagement in Rwanda, the Haitian crisis, and the Bosnian intervention.  Because these 





The Use of Constructivism in Identity Politics 
“The other” is sociopsychologically important in defining group membership at 
the national level (Huntington, 2004).  The exclusion component of identity, identifying 
who is in the group and who is not, is also important to national identity (Huntington, 
2004).  President Clinton used the constructivist principles of social inclusion and 
exclusion regularly because collectivism was a stated process of his grand strategy.  For 
example, Clinton used social characteristics to define the tenets of Americanism, which 
were the democratic values of individualism and pluralism, the capitalist values of free 
enterprise, private ownership, and economic competition, and the human values of self-
determination and freedom from oppressive and coercive governments (Clinton, 2000b).  
Though Clinton’s first inaugural speech did not mention national identity or American 
values, these two constructs soon became recurring elements of nearly all presidential 
speeches and publications. 
American national values. The essential aspects of national identity are the core 
values that influence not only how Americans perceive and project themselves but also 
what their strategic interests are (Huntington, 2004).  National values were the founding 
principles upon which President Clinton based his national security strategies, which 
were identified as representative democracy, free-market economics, and human rights 
(Clinton, 1994b).  The important connection that emerged was Clinton’s association of 
national ideals and values with the same level of influence as military and economic 
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interests.  This reliance on constructivist precepts as the foundation for national strategy 
produced consistent national interests throughout Clinton’s tenure. 
National interests. Clinton’s NSSs consistently relied on his stated national 
interests to define when, where, how, and what national power he might use for a specific 
goal.  Clinton’s national interests were divided into three categories.  Vital national 
interests directly affected the physical security of the American homeland, its allies, 
citizens, and the informational and economic infrastructure that supports America’s way 
of life (Clinton, 2000b, p. 8).  Important interests were lesser threats that could disrupt or 
destabilize vital interests in various regions, including inter-state conflicts and issues that 
could indirectly impact U.S. economic prosperity (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9).  Humanitarian 
interests were the third category, comprising natural and man-made disasters and 
democratic development (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9). 
All of Clinton’s NSSs identified the protection of national interests as the priority 
determining America’s involvement in international affairs (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9).  
America’s core values of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and economic and 
political freedoms guided both the selection of national interests and the national power 
resource(s) used to achieve those goals.  For example, Clinton (1995a) cited the core 
value of human rights defense to justify the deployment of U.S. military air assets to 
Bosnia after diplomatic efforts failed. 
Projecting economic prosperity was also a national security interest for President 
Clinton.  Although the development of these organizations actually began years before he 
became President, the creation of the NAFTA and the WTO (formerly the General 
95 
 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), Clinton’s support and efforts significantly helped their 
ratification by the U.S. Senate.  A list of Clinton’s national power projection in the 
international arena is included in Appendix A. 
American national identity. To understand America’s national identity 
evolution, it is important to recognize how President Clinton’s immediate predecessors 
explained American identity and the Soviet Union, which served as “the other” against 
which the United States defined itself.  President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the 
“Evil Empire” while emphasizing American identity as both politically and morally 
superior (Reagan, 1983).  Reagan (1988a) described America as the “vigorous leader of 
the free world” (para. 43)  Reagan (1988b) also claimed America’s national values of 
individual freedom and democracy made the United States the “moral leader” of the 
world struggle for freedom.  Similarly, citing Americans’ willingness to collaborate 
despite racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious differences, Clinton (2000a) specifically 
distinguished the United States from Bosnia, Burundi, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and the 
Middle East where these differences incited violent conflict.  Clinton identified not only 
racial, ethnic, and social tolerance as pillars of Americanism, but he also explained the 
aversion to violent conflict as a solution for sociopolitical challenges. 
Another important predecessor was President George H. W. Bush who at his 1993 
Address at West Point also proclaimed American world leadership based on national 
values.  Bush (1993a) advised against assuming the role of “world’s policeman” because 
of the risk of over-committing limited resources, a sentiment echoed by his successor, 
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Clinton.  Bush declared America the “only remaining superpower,” with the moral and 
material responsibility to lead the world toward a widespread democratic peace. 
Following the previous presidents, President Clinton endeavored to use national 
identity as justification for the use of national power.  In his 1994 SOTU address, Clinton 
identified the United States as the “world’s greatest power” and highlighted the 
international responsibilities accompanying that position.  Clinton (1994b, p. 5) coined 
the term “indispensable” nation, referring to the necessity of American involvement in 
the resolution of prominent global issues.  Clinton’s address on Bosnia clearly explained 
that “our values and interests as Americans require that we participate” in implementing 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (Clinton, 1995a, para. 1).  He noted that America was not 
just a place but a nation that acted on the ideals of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” for billions of people around the world (Clinton, 1995a, para. 3).  American 
identity required the nation to lead the expansion of these ideals by promoting peace and 
spreading democracy and economic prosperity. 
Strategy Publication and Support 
The literature review explained the NSS as the codification of American grand 
strategy.  The seven NSSs produced by the Clinton administration articulate grand 
strategy, including explanations of national security goals and preferred methods for 
achieving designated outcomes.  To achieve the broadly stated goal of global security, the 
1994 NSS listed such methods as the peace initiatives in the Middle East, the creation and 
expansion of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and denuclearization agreements with 
Russia and Ukraine (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii).  For the promotion of economic growth, 
97 
 
Clinton listed the passing of NAFTA, the creation of the WTO, and the granting of Most 
Favored Nation trade status to China, along with the completion of over 80 trade 
agreements (Clinton, 1995b, ii).   
Major national security themes. Clinton routinely emphasized soft power 
components of his national security agenda, including the use of international 
organizations, collective security processes and alliances, and the penchant for diplomatic 
engagement.  All seven NSSs emphasized these components, especially the use of the 
WTO, NATO in Europe, the UN, and other regional and global organizations for various 
contingency operations prevalent during the 1990s.  Clinton encouraged NATO to 
develop a new post-Cold War purpose in 1995, supporting the Dayton Peace Accords 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, providing regional security and 
peacekeeping operations (NATO, 2019).  Additionally, Clinton’s first NSS stated both 
American interests and national values, emphasizing its reflection of cultural 
underwriting of strategic interests (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii).   
A critical observation emerged after reading this data.  The NSSs appeared to be 
published partially for public (domestic and international) consumption as a general 
outline of national priorities, goals, and likely methods.  Additionally, they appeared to 
be written to inform and explain guidelines for senior policymakers and executioners who 
applied the information to sectors under their control.  However, the foreign policy 
speeches given by presidents are often specifically designed to generate public support 
for their international decisions (Dueck, 2006). 
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Additionally, after conducting a key word (and word derivates) search of 
important documents, the research produced another observation of the NSSs.  The 
reference to “leader” more than doubled from 1994 to 2000.  The use of the word 
“values” went from five in 1994 to 46 in 2000, and references to “ideals” increased from 
one to six in the same period.  The term “selective” was used an average of four times in 
each of the NSSs in this period.  This illustrates Clinton’s increased reliance on cultural 
references to explain and justify his grand strategy of primacy and selective engagement.   
Global leadership. In 1994, Clinton declared that because of America’s 
democratic values and unparalleled economic and military power, the United States was 
indispensable to international peace and prosperity and therefore must use global 
leadership to ensure world peace and stability (Clinton, 1994b, p. 5).  Clinton also 
identified America as the world’s only “superpower,” which brought both privileges of 
influence and responsibilities of global leadership.  He used that title to admonish 
isolationists yet cautioned against strategic over-reach.  This dichotomy was a recurring 
struggle within Clinton’s calculus for international action (J. L. Gaddis, 2002; Kissinger, 
2001).   
Collective action. Clinton’s reliance on economic growth contributed to the 
creation of major international institutions WTO and NAFTA.  One of the pervasive 
themes in Clinton’s NSSs is the proclivity for collective action on national security 
issues.  Additionally, collective security fully supports the social aspects of constructivist 
theory.  Collective security was used to justify and explain several important principles 
common among his published strategies and speeches.  Clinton’s support for the final 
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stages in the creation of both NAFTA and the WTO exemplified his use of international 
organizations and their collectivist approach to international trade.  Clinton was a 
signatory on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, although the treaty has not 
been ratified by the Senate (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
Preparatory Commission, 1996).   
Assertive multilateralism. The U.N., NATO, the WTO, and others were useful to 
the President facing multiple humanitarian and diplomatic crises concurrently.  While 
Cold War American presidents routinely supported the U.N., President Clinton’s decision 
to align U.S. expeditionary ventures with U.N.-supported operations marked a distinction 
for collaboration in the new era.  The U.S. support for U.N. efforts to return Haitian 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide following a 1991 military coup d’état is an example of 
Clinton’s reliance on international organizations. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 reaffirmed nine previous 
resolutions aimed at reestablishing the constitutionally elected president of Haiti, by 
military force if necessary (U.N. Security Council, 1994).  President Clinton increased his 
predecessor’s soft power pressure with coercive diplomacy, and hard power efforts with 
broader military and economic sanctions on Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras’ military 
regime (Office of the Historian, 2000).  U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright declared 
this approach a break from Cold War-era norms and termed the policy “assertive 
multilateralism” (Office of the Historian, 2000).   
When Cedras failed to comply with the 1993 Governor’s Island Accord he signed 
with Aristide, the U.S. led the U.N. imposing a naval blockade on the island nation and 
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began planning a military intervention.  Clinton hoped the threat of a U.S. invasion would 
force Cedras to step down, but he used the U.N. mandate to recruit support from 
Caribbean nations totaling a force of nearly 25,000, the vast majority from the U.S.  
Clinton also sent former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and then-former Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to negotiate with Cedras under threat of 
military invasion.  General Hugh Shelton commanded the invasion force but accepted 
Cedras’ peaceful transition without the use of force (Office of the Historian, 2000).  
Clinton’s foreign policy relied heavily on the use of institutions and organizations, 
prompting the Presidential Decision Directive/ National Security Council -25 (1994) and 
56 (1997), which outlined protocols for the U.S. to manage complex humanitarian and 
contingency operations.  Directive 25 declared multilateralism a “cost effective” method 
for managing multiple operations around the world.  The directive listed the increased 
frequency of several crises unique to the post-Cold War era and declared the U.S. would 
lead the U.N.S.C. to create multilateral forces to address the challenges when appropriate.   
Values-driven engagement. Throughout modern history, American leaders 
selectively supported various natural and man-made humanitarian crises.  The end of the 
Cold War and the decentralization of international powers enabled numerous 
humanitarian conflicts to emerge, many of which were long suppressed by former 
authoritarian regimes.  Consequently, the 1990s saw an increased interest in international 
humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict (Roberts, 1999).  Two 
significant changes of the U.N.’s humanitarian crises response procedures were supported 
by both President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton: the increased U.N. support 
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of non-combatants in humanitarian in spite of opposition from hostile authoritarian 
regimes, and the introduction of military “Peace Keeper” forces to support this 
engagement (Roberts, 1999). 
President Clinton consistently determined national interests based on his 
definition of national values, prominently focusing on international humanitarian crises, 
with the notable decision not to push for stronger IC engagement during the 1994 
Rwandan genocide.  The National Security Archive at George Washington University 
used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain evidence Clinton’s 1993 and 1994 
President’s Daily Briefings included CIA warnings of the impending and ongoing 
slaughter of Tutsis by the Hutu nationalists (National Security Archive, 2017).   
Additionally, almost 300 recently declassified diplomatic cables detail numerous 
warnings sent from the limited peace keeping force in Kigali to the U. N. Secretary 
General between January 11, 1994 and the beginning of killings in April 1994 (National 
Security Archive, 2017).  Similar documents detail U.N.S.C. discussions about the 
Rwandan situation from 1992 through 1994, demonstrating the leading world powers 
were knowledgeable about and discussed the situation before and during the crisis, yet 
decided not to engage.  Four years after the Rwandan crisis, Clinton’s speech to the 
people of Rwanda highlighted very important human characteristics shared by all 
peoples, including Africans and Americans, and proposed future U.S. and IC engagement 
to support recovery and prevent future crises (Clinton, 1998b). 
U.N.S.C. Resolution 918 authorized increasing the U.N. Peacekeeping force to 
5,500 personnel (Council, 1994).  On July 22, 1994 President Clinton announced a 
102 
 
multilateral operation called “Support Hope”, sending a large contingent of U.S. and IC 
forces to Rwanda and neighboring Uganda (Cunitz, 1995).  The first shipment of food 
arrived in Uganda, the staging area, two days later.  Within two weeks, the killings were 
abated and humanitarian assistance began to reach areas deep in the country. 
In 1996 the Clinton Administration launched the African Crisis Response 
Initiative.  The program’s purpose was to coordinate with IC partners and African nations 
to plan and support both humanitarian and peacekeeping operations on the continent.  
The program supported several of Clinton’s grand strategy goals.  First, because the 
program was limited to democratic nations, it supported Clinton’s “enlargement” goal of 
growing democracies.  Second, the program allowed Clinton to selectively determine 
when and how to provide humanitarian assistance to other nations while still controlling 
limited U.S. resources. 
The Use of National Power (Hard and Soft) 
Grand strategy requires the use of national power to achieve national security 
aims (Kissinger, 1957).  Clinton’s NSSs consistently identified two power methods for 
promoting strategic success: economic prosperity underwrites national security, and 
democracy promotion supports a safe international environment (Clinton, The NSS, 
1994c, p. i).  Clinton specifically favored certain types of national power, with unilateral 
military activity as the lowest frequency.  With his first three NSSs entitled “Engagement 
and Enlargement” Clinton (1994c, 1995c, 1996c) identified hard power economics as his 
guiding international strategy.  However, diplomacy provided him with pivotal successes 
in Western Europe (Good Friday Peace Accords, 1998), Eastern Europe (Dayton Peace 
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Accords, 1995), the Middle East (four peace agreements between Israel and her 
neighbors, 1993, 1994, 1998, and 2999), and the Caribbean (Haiti, 1994). 
In Clinton’s (1999b) Kosovo speech, he implied America led the world with 
intolerance for genocide or “ethnic cleansing” (p. 1).  He also explained American 
strategy was to first try soft power (diplomacy) before employing hard power tactics in 
the promotion of democratic values.  Clinton cautiously used military power unilaterally.  
On June 26, 1993, Clinton launched 23 Tomahawk missiles into Iraqi intelligence 
headquarters in downtown Bagdad in response to reports Saddam Hussein launched 
efforts to assassinate President George H.W. Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait 
(The Miller Center, 2019).  He also used economic power to lift the longstanding trade 
embargo against Vietnam, renewed Most Favored Trade status for China, ushered 
NAFTA and the WTO Center into existence.  Clinton also used diplomatic power to 
bring the Oslo Accords Peace Plan between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.   
Grand Strategy Determination 
Under President Clinton, grand strategy was predicated on America’s founding 
national values and ideals (Clinton, 2000a, p. 5).  Contextually, his NSSs highlighted the 
political and economic interdependence globalization promoted between the U.S. and 
other nations.  Clinton’s NSSs also discussed advancing technology’s impact on 
international communication, and problematic social and ethnic dynamics in Eastern 
Europe, Africa, and South America, including transnational refugees.  Upon taking 
office, and reaffirmed at his second inaugural, Clinton identified his reliance on 
104 
 
international organizations, especially NATO and the U.N., and the use of collective 
security as essential pillars of American engagement (Clinton, 1997a). 
Clinton’s 1994 NSS, among others, clearly identifies “Selective Engagement” as 
the grand strategy guiding his use of national power, specifically military force (p. 10).  
While the NSS explains the necessity to efficiently husband scarce national resources, 
and it does not specify any specific scenarios for the deployment of U.S. forces, the 
assertion that the decisions were made “selectively” clearly explained the grand strategy 
scheme.  Clinton (1994b) reaffirmed this choice by stating the U.S. would “engage” 
national interests selectively (p. 5), “target” military threats selectively (p. 10), or 
“employ” resources “selectively” (p. 13).  Because each of Clinton’s seven NSSs were 
nearly identical, with minor revisions, they all explain Selective Engagement at least five 
times. 
Robert Art (1999) delineated a typology of seven grand strategy choices for post-
Cold War America.  Art’s explanations of American national interests (e.g. great power 
peace, global economic freedom, and democratic expansion) support the Selective 
Engagement strategy expressed in each of Clinton’s NSSs.  Lastly, Art (1999) confirms 
America’s “Selective Engagement” grand strategy through Clinton’s choices to act or 
lead in a variety of international incidents, but not others, which are illustrated below. 
Colin Dueck’s (2006) provided the third confirmation of “Selective Engagement” 
as Clinton’s grand strategy.  Dueck cited the nearly five decades of liberal globalism that 
guided America’s Cold War foreign policy as the long-standing trend Clinton was 
compelled to follow (p. 146).  Additionally, Dueck noted America’s liberal cultural 
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traditions provided the requisite domestic support for Clinton’s choices.  Dueck went on 
to systematically invalidate the grand strategy alternatives to “Selective Engagement”.  
The three observations above provided the triangulation from different sources that 
confirm Clinton’s grand strategy of “Selective Engagement”. 
However, it became clear that President Clinton supported and promoted the 
national identity of American exceptionalism, implementing a second grand strategy of 
American Primacy.  Clinton’s (1996e) speech on NATO specifically cited America as the 
“indispensable nation”.  Clinton predicated this identity on America’s post-Cold War 
great power status, America’s special responsibility to support the growth of democracy, 
and the nation’s broad and unique global interests and responsibilities  (Clinton, 1996c). 
Major strategic themes. The major themes of Clinton’s National Security 
Strategies were consistently identified and explained throughout the series of seven 
published strategies.  The guiding principles were clearly Stated in each NSS publication: 
a) enhancing security, b) improving economic prosperity, c) democracy promotion, d) 
international engagement, e) the U.S. as the world’s “leader”, but not the world’s 
“policeman”, and f) a reliance on multilateralism with close allies (Clinton, 1994b).  In 
fact, similar themes populated George H. W. Bush’s (1993b) NSS as Clinton (1994b) 
listed many of the same threats his predecessor used:  transnational threats included 
international organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental security, terrorism, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction.  Regional issues, such as varying 
humanitarian crises in Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean were of noticeable importance 
throughout his tenure.  These threats produced similar goals: preventing regional 
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destabilization due to violence and refugee flow, stopping genocide and humanitarian 
crises, and the use of international organizations to address the issues (Clinton, The NSS, 
1994c, p. 21).   
Another regional issue was the protection of international trade, which supported 
American economic prosperity.  Protecting commerce routes in the Pacific and Atlantic 
theaters were of paramount concern to President Clinton.  Protecting world shipping 
lanes and trade routes became the American Navy’s mantle since the end of WWII.  
Clinton continued the tradition.  While Clinton clearly preferred multilateralism, he did 
use hard (military) power unilaterally several times during his tenure.  Clinton attacked 
Saddam Hussein’s military bases in retaliation for the ejection of international inspectors.  
He launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to degrade Iraqi chemical weapons capability 
(Department of Defense, 2019b).   
National identity and grand strategy. This research showed that while President 
Clinton (1993a) did not mention national identity or American values in his first 
inaugural speech, he soon learned the importance of these references for explaining and 
justifying his use of national power.  President Clinton used the traditions of American 
values and national history to inform his evolving narrative of American identity.  Before 
the Joint Session of Congress, President Clinton (1993b) cited “old” American values of 
individual responsibility for family, faith, and community as founding principles for his 
“new” course for the nation.  By April of his first year, President Clinton (1993c) cited 
national values of responsibility, opportunity, respect for each other, and community to 
promote volunteerism and national service.  Clinton’s 1996 and 1998 SOTU speeches 
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specifically explained American national identity in the context of liberalism’s shared 
historical identity, celebration of diversity, and national unity (see Appendix B).  Nearly 
all his successive speeches of international consequence cited American values as 
justification for strategic policy.   
President Clinton’s (1993d) address on the U.S. involvement in Somalia 
explained his reliance on the idea of American exceptionalism by explaining that “only 
the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time” (p. 1).  
Clinton Stated America’s conscience and best tradition spurred national engagement to 
stop the humanitarian crisis.  These ideational constructs justified the use of American 
military force in Somalia, and later in Bosnia (Clinton, 1995b), and were helpful in 
swaying public support.  By the end of his second year in office, President Clinton 
(1994e) specifically Stated America’s foreign policies would reflect her values.  
Additionally, in the 1996 presidential debate with Senator Robert Dole, President Clinton 
further aligned the most important use of national power, military deployment, with 
American values.  Clinton (1996d) told the world that for him to deploy military forces 
Americas vital national interests and values must be at stake. 
Clinton used America’s Cold War tradition of international engagement, the idea 
of national exceptionalism, and the cultural power of traditional American values to 
justify U.S. foreign policy and the expenditure of national power.  The only caveat to this 
process was evident in Clinton’s NSSs, all of which routinely explained the variable of 
American national power expenditure would be “selective engagement” in international 
ventures that involved only the most vital national interests and the availability of 
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national resources.  This mind map portrays President Clinton’s use of national values 
and American history to construct his vision of American national identity as 
“exceptional”.  Clinton used this identity to define his grand strategy of Primacy and 
Selective Engagement, pivoting the deployment of national resources on the balance of 
national interests and values at stake.  The figure below illustrates the evolution of 

























































Alternate national identity definitions. Krebs (2015, p. 183) noted American 
national identity influences strategic engagement and power choices for presidents.  
Conversely, alternate identity definitions, often proposed by competing domestic political 
interests, may complicate or undermine a president’s ability to define the strategic 
situation in a manner supportive of his choices.  Dominating the national political 
narrative is essential for political leadership in democracies (Krebs, 2015, p. 31) 
A review of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune editorials for up to five 
days after a major international event did not yield contrasts or challenges to Clinton’s 
definition of American national identity or his reliance on democratic values for strategic 
decisions.  All of the editorials reviewed for this research presented policy-centered 
agreement, dissent, or advice on various international situations.  For example, Clinton’s 
nuclear negotiations with North Korea, South Korea and Japan spanned nearly his entire 
tenure, with mixed results at best.  The New York Times (1993) editorial advised Clinton 
to continue the diplomatic approach as the best course of action.   
During terms in office, Clinton faced strong opposition from the Republican Party 
on a variety of issues.  When the Republicans controlled the House of Representatives, 
Speaker Newt Gingrich provided consistent political opposition to Clinton.  While 
Gingrich usually confined himself to domestic matters of political difference, he rarely 
offered alternative views on matters of foreign policy.  The New York Times (Sciolino, 
1995), and Washington Post (Kovaleski, 1995) reported an incident where Newt Gingrich 
publicly expressed an opinion that the U.S. should recognize Hong Kong as a State, in 
direct contrast to the long-standing “One China” policy codified during the Nixon 
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administration and adhered to by successive presidents, including President Clinton.  As 
the Speaker of the House, and third in line for the presidency, Gingrich’s comments 
carried some weight in the political discourse of the time.  However, after Dr. Henry 
Kissinger called Gingrich from China, Gingrich later explained his comments as “a joke” 
(Kovaleski, 1995; Sciolino, 1995).  Gingrich made further comments specifically 
removing himself from foreign policy conversations. 
On Rwanda, the New York Times supported Clinton’s decision not to send troops 
into the ongoing conflict because of concerns for troop safety and, as the editorial 
specifically explained, Rwanda did not present a clear and vital interest for the U.S. (The 
New York Times Editorial Board, 1994a).  However, the Times did support sending 
humanitarian aid, and eventually U.S. forces in support of the U.N. mandate as long as 
the troops were not in direct conflict with hostile forces.   
Conversely, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune supported NATO’s 
airstrikes on Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors against ethnic Muslims (The Chicago 
Tribune Editorial, 1994; The New York Times Editorial Board, 1994b).  The New York 
Times editorial agreed with Clinton’s recommendations for NATO’s new post-Cold War 
role: as unbiased peacekeepers in support of U.N.S.C. resolutions.  However, the New 
York Times disputed Clinton’s estimation of the proposed NATO benefits by raising 
concerns Russia would view the process threateningly.  The Chicago Tribune, normally 
supportive of a conservative agenda, approved of Clinton’s 1993 unilateral Tomahawk 
missile strike on Iraqi intelligence facilities in response to the reported assassination 
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attempt on former President George H.W. Bush (The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, 
1993). 
Republican rebuttals. In the Republican rebuttal to the 1993 SOTU address, 
Illinois Congressman Robert Michel warned the incoming president that the as long as 
his foreign policy adhered to “traditional” American values, they would support the 
policy (Michel, 1993).  However, Michel cautioned if Clinton’s explanation(s) for his 
strategic activity was not based on supporting American values and national interests, the 
Republicans would oppose the policy.  This seemed like a warning to simply include 
values references in each activity’s justification to preclude Republican opposition.  The 
Congressman’s rebuttal did not include a description or delineation of the values he 
required the President to support. 
The Republican’s 1994 SOTU rebuttal was the only instance of the party 
challenging President Clinton on national security issues.  Kansas Senator Robert Dole’s 
rebuttal speech celebrated and promoted the issue of American leadership in world affairs 
(Dole, 1994).  Dole, a WWII veteran, specifically confronted Clinton’s proposed 
budgetary “slashing” of defense spending, even though defense spending had steadily 
declined annually since the beginning of President Reagan’s second term (Korb, Conley, 
& Rothman, 2011).  However, Dole’s push to expand American international leadership 
internationally did not mention that it was predicated on cultural values.  Dole explained 
it was America’s post-World War II  mission to provide international leadership. 
The Republican’s 1996 SOTU rebuttal, again given by Senator Robert Dole, 
directly challenged President Clinton on the subject of American values, specifically 
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mentioning the characteristics of “self-reliance and family” (sic) (Dole, The American 
Presidency Project, 1996).  However, the public policies disputed by Senator Dole 
included federal government budget deficits, growth of the welfare State, and the seating 
of partisan (in this case, “liberal) judges to the federal bench.  As Senator Dole’s recalled 
conservative American traditions reduced taxes and limited government, his rebuttal was 
focused only on domestic political issues without mention of international relations or 
national security. 
Mississippi Senator Trent Lott gave the Republican’s rebuttal to President 
Clinton’s 1998 SOTU address.  In keeping with the tradition of the era, Senator Lott 
disputed Clinton’s policies on the federal deficit, limited government, “over-regulation” 
and taxation, Medicare expansion, and the “liberalization” of public education  (Lott, 
1998).  Senator Lott (1998) specifically cited traditional American values of “family, 
faith, and freedom” as he proposed alternative domestic policies.  However, directly 
addressing then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,  Senator Lott unequivocally exclaimed 
his support for President Clinton’s defense of American national interests abroad and 
protection of the homeland. 
Summarily, Republican rebuttals to the Clinton SOTU addresses were not used to 
propose alternative national identities or foreign policies, save Dole’s push for greater 
American leadership in the early days of the Clinton administration. This research 
observed rare challenges to President Clinton on the issue of national identity and foreign 
policy.  Conversely, Republicans routinely challenges President Clinton’s domestic 
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policies, citing characteristics favored by conservatives as “traditional” American values 
juxtaposed to Clinton’s agenda. 
Observations and Results 
How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national identity as a 
justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American 
values?”  Clinton’s (1994b) recurring expression of America as the “indispensable 
nation” solidified American identity as the global leader and sole superpower.  Clinton’s 
“indispensable” label justified his grand strategy of Primacy, while his caution against 
becoming the world’s policeman signaled his aversion to indiscriminate international 
expeditions by being “selective” in choosing America’s missions abroad (Clinton, 
1996c).  
Continuity of national values as both the source and purpose of national power 
projection and the mantle of international leadership continued under President Clinton, 
transcending the last two Cold War presidents into the next period.  Promotion of 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law by hard and soft power means were decades-
long traditions of American Cold War strategy and cornerstones of Clinton’s (1994b) 
grand strategy.  Collective security and interventionism also continued, although 
according to Clinton’s (1995c, p. 7) Selective Engagement calculations the U.S. would 
not be the “world’s policeman”.  Unilateral military actions were relatively rare under 
Clinton. 
How did America’s presidentially constructed national identity influence its post-
Cold War grand strategy? President Clinton’s national security strategies specifically 
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identified long-standing American cultural values as the source and purpose of American 
NSS (Clinton, 1994b).  President Clinton’s use of both hard power and soft power to 
achieve national security ends clearly validated his Selective Engagement grand strategy 
because they showed his preference for diplomacy and aversion to international 
expeditions.  President Clinton declared on multiple occasions and through different 
publications that he did not want to U.S. to become the world’s policeman, so he chose 
which international activities fit within his description of national interests, abstaining 
from those situations he did not consider important enough for the expenditure of limited 
American power resources. 
President Clinton’s use of national values, predicated on liberalism and 
democracy, enabled him to leverage America’s soft power tools of diplomacy and 
cultural affinity to forge difficult yet significant peace agreements in nearly every region 
of the world.  In North America, Clinton’s peaceful transition for Haiti was a significant 
accomplishment.  His completion of NAFTA and financial support of Mexico helped 
stabilize the North American economic surge of the 1990s.  In Asia, Clinton’s support for 
China’s entrance in the WTO and granting most favored nation status enabled that 
country to significantly improve its access to global markets.  In Europe and the Middle 
East Clinton encouraged or participated in peace agreements between Northern Ireland 
and Britain, Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Serbia; and the Russian nuclear reduction 
agreement helped reduce stockpiles of unsecured fuel and reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons (see Appendix A). 
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Constructivism proved a valuable research tool because soft power was pivotal to 
the vast majority of President Clinton’s international successes.  Clinton’s use of 
diplomacy secured peace agreements in various world regions, including the Caribbean 
(Haiti), the Middle East (Israel and Palestine), and Europe (Northern Ireland and 
England).  Even Clinton’s rare use of national hard power (military) was coordinated 
within the context of U.N. approval and conducted with the support of allies. 
Summary 
As the first post-Cold War President, Clinton defined American national values 
consistent with his immediate predecessors and used those values to determine national 
strategic interests.  Clinton identified a multi-prong grand strategy of Primacy and 
Selective Engagement to allow himself the freedom to restrain the U.S. from becoming 
the world’s policeman, yet allow for international leadership on issues at the highest 
levels of national interest.  Clinton’s national security strategies, publications, and 
speeches clearly delineated his view of American values as justification for the 
expenditure of national resources for strategic ends. 
The definition of national identity espoused by President Clinton went 
unchallenged at a pivotal point in American history.  This research showed that the 
editorial boards of the New York Times, generally considered a liberal publication, and 
the Chicago Tribune, considered a conservative publication, did not effectively challenge 
Clinton’s justifications for international engagement based on national identity or 
national values.  Additionally, the Republican rebuttals to the annual SOTU addresses did 
not offer any significant challenge to President Clinton’s description of national values, 
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constructed national identity, defined national interests, or use of national power 
resources.  The lack of public discourse on national identity, especially when it’s used to 
justify the use of national power, presents a very important opportunity for a renewed 
debate on national identity and a thorough examination of the detailed, not generalized, 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This study’s purpose was to examine the narration of national identity as a pillar 
of grand strategy.  Because a nation derives its purpose from its identity, determining the 
root of that identity helps illuminate the common determinants for different national 
security activities (Huntington, 2004).  This research is important because President 
Clinton, as the first American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security 
environment without great power threats, with nearly unlimited international political 
capital, and with undisputed national power at his disposal (Hyland, 1999).  Clinton’s 
grand strategy, and the national identity he used to validate that strategy, explained 
America’s character and purpose in cultural and strategic terms.  In many of his NSSs, 
Clinton explained that America’s tradition role of world leadership would continue, 
promoting democratic values, human rights, and good governance, but that the United 
States would not act as the world’s policeman, indiscriminately inserting itself into every 
national and international crisis (Clinton, 1994b, 1996b, 1998b).  Thus, President Clinton 
continued many of the national characteristics and priorities of his immediate 
predecessors while resisting the temptation to enter international affairs (Clinton, 1995c, 
p. 7). This directly answered one of the research questions: How did President Clinton 
define American national identity as a foundation for national security decisions?   
The other research question asked, “How did President Clinton define America’s 
post-Cold War national identity as a justification for selecting his grand strategy?”  
Because constructivism explains national identity as a social construct, President 
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Clinton’s narratives, including the SOTU and inaugural speeches, along with the annual 
NSS, routinely cited traditional American values and Cold War leadership to continue 
and reinforce the idea of American world leadership.  President Clinton’s 1994, 1995, 
and 1996 NSSs cited America’s hard power strength (military and economic) and 
democratic values as the source of America being “indispensable” to peace and 
prosperity in world affairs.  Clinton’s SOTU narratives also routinely linked the 
promotion of peace and security abroad with domestic peace, security, and prosperity. 
Summary of the Study 
I examined the description and use of American national identity to support grand 
strategy.  In 1994, President Clinton’s first NSS identified “engagement and 
enlargement” as his foreign policy theme.  Though Clinton continued his predecessors’ 
reliance on the support for human rights, democracy promotion, and good governance in 
developing regions, he emphasized the hard power tools of economic engagement and 
trade to attract nations to the democratic model.  He used the WTO, NAFTA, and trade 
agreements to enhance American influence in the region and around the world. 
Clinton (1994b) also described American values of individual freedom, human 
dignity, and equality as the impetus for national interests and NSS (p. ii).  In many 
speeches around the world, Clinton emphasized tolerance, fair treatment for minorities, 
human dignity, and human rights as the cornerstone of successful democracies (Clinton, 
1995b, 1998b, 1999a).  Thus, Clinton’s narratives defined post-Cold War American 
national identity as the “indispensable nation” that promoted democracy and free trade 
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around the world but did not act as the world’s policeman, engaging indiscriminately in 
every international dispute (p. 5).  
Clinton (1994b, 1995c) NSSs also identified selective engagement as his chosen 
grand strategy because it afforded the latitude to carefully differentiate national interests 
from other situations of lesser importance to national security.  This strategy allowed the 
president to preserve finite national resources and prevent American over-commitment in 
regional activities that were of lesser national concern.  Further, Clinton relied on soft 
power to promote important peace agreements in Europe (Bosnia, Northern Ireland) and 
the Middle East (Israel), confirming the importance of U.S. influence in world affairs. 
Along with the results on Clinton’s grand strategy related to national identity, 
public debate on post-Cold War national identity was not evident in this research.  For 
instance, review of the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune editorials did not 
uncover significant discussion of Clinton’s definition of America’s identity or role in 
world affairs.  Speaker Gingrich’s brief proposal about American foreign policy in Asia 
also did not produce lasting public debate on the issue.  Further, the republican rebuttals 
to President Clinton’s SOTU addresses did not present alternative national identity 
descriptions or significantly challenge him on national security. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The research produced several conclusions.  The assumption that President 
Clinton did not adhere to any specific grand strategy but was strategically adrift (Biddle, 
2012; Suri, 2009; Walton, 2012) was not supported by this research.  Clinton’s NSSs 
showed significant similarity across important dimensions, including references to 
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American liberal culture and democratic values as the source and purpose of American 
national security policy.  President Clinton consistently cited his definition of American 
national identity characteristics as justification for international engagement and national 
security policy. 
Results also showed that Clinton identified and used selective engagement as his 
grand strategy, which disconfirmed several authors who either claimed that America did 
not have a coherent post-Cold War grand strategy or that the strategy was something 
other than selective engagement.  For example, Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), and Suri 
(2009) described what they perceived as Clinton’s their perceived lack of grand strategy 
as strategic drift.  Layne (2006) also incorrectly identified American grand strategy as 
extra-regional hegemony.  
Limitations of the Study 
This study did not involve a longitudinal perspective of American national 
identity.  This absence shows President Clinton’s definition on national identity from a 
singular perspective in time instead of as a point on a continuum of American foreign 
policy across identifiable national or international periods.  Observing and understanding 
American national identity at important points in international epochs could explain the 
trajectory of change and continuity since the nation’s founding.  These observations 
could then be compared to other significant international leaders, such as Greek-, Roman-
, French-, and British-dominated periods.   
Additionally, understanding American national identity at the end of the Cold 
War could allow political leaders, scholars, and national security practitioners to assess 
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and compare how American identity evolves and how that evolution impacts the use of 
national power in contemporary international situations.  As each president proposes, 
defines, and projects his or her version of national identity, national leaders, scholars, and 
voters need to assess the degree to which that new definition comports with their 
understanding of traditional or contemporary America.   
Recommendations 
Presidential description of national identity can be a critical national security tool 
because it defines national purpose, national interests, and the sequence of acceptable 
tools used to accomplish international goals.  Because national identity is pivotal to 
national security, it should be regularly analyzed and debated in the public sphere.  
Leading news outlets should challenge, support, and offer viable alternatives to 
presidential definitions when they are determined to be incongruent with America’s best 
interests.  Similarly, scholarly publications should examine presidential definitions of 
identity to determine their historical continuity or divergence.   
Implications for Positive Sociopolitical Impact 
This research offers insight into the creation and narration of American national 
identity at a critical junction in national and international history.  Because that identity is 
used as a grand strategy determinant and justification for national security activities, the 
importance of identity should be deliberately debated in the public space to better ensure 
long term strategic continuity with American historical identity. 
Understanding the power national identity wields in influencing and justifying 
national interests and strategic choices can be an invaluable tool for political and social 
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leadership.  As America’s world leadership evolves in the post-Cold War era, and other 
nations create new power centers in various regions and in different national security 
dimensions (i.e. political, cultural, economic) cultural affinity with international peers 
may prove to be the ultimate soft power, and far more effective than hard power.  When 
presidents create national identities (such as the “leader of the free world”) that 
international allies can associate with and aspire to, America increases its power through 
attraction, collaboration, and influence, which leads to cooperation on major national 
security initiatives (Krebs, 2015).  
A rising China and a resurgent Russia have reignited and redefined great power 
competition in the 21st century.  The U.S. can ill-afford to support right-wing dictators 
around the world, as it did during the Cold War, and both Russia and China currently 
serve as “spoilers” by vetoing controversial United Nations resolutions they deem 
unacceptable and militarily supporting authoritarian allies such as Kim Jong Il in North 
Korea and Bashad al Assad in Syria.  Therefore, the U.S. must use its traditional national 
identity components (e.g., respect for human rights, multilateralism, support for 
democracy) to attract partners to its banner, organize and energize them into effective 
cohorts, emphasizing the significance of soft power to grow the alliance as President 
Clinton (1994c) strategy of “engagement and enlargement”  sought to do. 
The Trans Pacific Partnership , President Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia in 
response to an emergent China, would have given the U.S. cultural and economic 
leadership in more than 40 percent of the global economy and the world’s largest free 
trade zone (McBride & Chatzky, 2019).  President Trump’s decision to withdraw from 
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TPP eliminated that opportunity and a valuable international dimension to American 
regional leverage.  Building and maintaining alliances with nations that share similar 
cultural tenets is important, but it is increasingly relevant to the security of America’s 
future that the nation promote economic interdependence and liberal democratic values in 
regions and among nations where illiberal democracy or authoritarianism is the trend 
(Kupchan, 2007). 
The potential impact of this research may be no less than influencing 
consideration for the way the most powerful nation on earth organized its interactions 
with other nations and used national power components in the immediate post-Cold War 
era.  This research may affect the way American leaders and the broader public view 
national identity and its influence in determining national security objectives, tools, and 
methods of using national power to shape the international environment.  For example, as 
President George W. Bush introduced “3-D National Security” (Defense, Diplomacy, and 
Development) by elevating foreign aid and development to near-cabinet level status in his 
2006 National Security Strategy, he enhanced America’s commitment to improve 
struggling national governments’ capacities to function effectively and improve the their 
citizens’ lives. 
This research may also have the potential for international implications, assuming 
an isomorphic approach to linguistic and discourse analysis.  As national leaders around 
the world seek to justify their national interests, they may rely on their own definitions of 
cultural and national identity to guide and justify their strategic policies.  Primary 
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elements of the national identity will reassure their domestic stakeholders and buttresses 
their national concept of “self” in the community of nations. 
Conclusion 
Understanding American national identity is critical to understanding “who we 
are” as a nation, what identity-associated U.S. national security priorities are delineated 
in American grand strategy, and what national power resources elected and appointed 
national leaders should leverage to reach international goals.  President Clinton 
demonstrated the link between national identity and national interests by using his 
explanation of national values as justification for strategic choices.  However, Clinton 
leveraged the grand strategy variable of Selective Engagement to enable America to 
decline involvement in situations he deemed less vital to American interests (Clinton, 
The NSS, 1995c).  Selective Engagement enabled Clinton to prevent his administration 
from becoming the “world’s policeman” and entangling itself in the numerous crises 
around the globe as many long-smoldering societal and ethnic conflicts erupted in the 
power vacuum of dissolving authoritarian regimes and unstable national power 
structures. 
American values, the justification for its grand strategy and international activity, 
proved a cogent dimension of America’s soft power.    In the 21st century, the rising 
prevalence of soft power over hard power is due in large part to the diffusion of influence 
within and among State and non-State actors on the international landscape.  The 
increasing perception among scholars and practitioners that, in a growing number of 
situations, the value and influence of soft power supersedes that of hard power suggests 
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America’s future influence rests less with her military capability than with her ability to 
attract and coordinate with friends and followers (Nye, 2004).  This fits well within 
America’s longstanding strategies of cooperative security and multilateralism.  Rising 
powers, such as China, use their massive economic connections regionally and globally 
to increase their hard power alliances, yet China has struggled to attract and influence 
even regional allies largely because of its preference for hard power’s dominating posture 
and abrasive tactics (Meade & Keeley, 2017). 
Because this research observed an element of America’s soft power (identity), and 
an important national power dynamic (grand strategy) using constructivist principles, 
there is cause for concern that President Trump’s international  machinations may be 
costing America supremacy in an increasingly important national power metric (Meade 
& Keeley, 2017).  America’s long-standing alliances with five of the top seven most 
powerful nations supports her sustained position as the world’s most important nation 
(Meade & Keeley, 2017).  While several global power rating organizations scored the 
U.S. as “most” powerful, the prevailing matrix was heavily favored toward hard power 
metrics of military capability and economic capacity.  However, the Pew Research Center 
(2018) found indications that America’s soft power is declining, due in large part to 
President Trump’s international image of being untrustworthy to lead on global issues (p. 
3).   
If the U.S. wants to sustain or increase its international influence, it would need to 
ensure the presidents it elects offer and adhere to the values and traditions compatible 
with wielding the prolific tool of soft power.  This research showed how President 
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Clinton’s (1994c) preference for diplomatic leverage enabled him to build an important 
alliance with a declining Russia, an emerging China, and craft pivotal peace initiatives in 
some of the world’s fiercest conflicts.  President Clinton’s constructed national identity 
of primacy, coupled with strong diplomatic economic and peace initiatives provided the 
international community with decisive and inclusive leadership.  As a source of 
international influence, America’s soft power is a potent resource for leaders who use 
America’s liberal values to construct a welcoming national identity of inclusion and 
fairness.  With the 2020 elections on the horizon, American would do well to listen 
carefully to the national identity vision each candidate offers, and, for those who value 
America’s global leadership, consider well how each candidate’s proposed identity may 
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Appendix A: National Power Projection Timeline 1993-2000 
  Hard Power- Military Incident 
 
06/26/1993: Navy attacks Baghdad 
The U.S. Navy, under President Clinton’s orders, attacks Iraqi intelligence operations 
in downtown Baghdad after learning that Iraqis had plotted to kill former President 
Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. The twenty-three tomahawk missiles 
fired reportedly kill eight people.  
 
09/18/1994: Haiti general cedes power 
After a tense stand-off with the Clinton administration, Haiti’s military government, 
led by General Raoul Cedras, agrees to cede power. The administration, along with 
the United Nations, had tried for over a year to restore the democratically elected 
president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in a coup on 
September 30, 1991. 
 
10/09/1994: Deterring invasion of Kuwait 
The Clinton administration announces plans to send more than 35,000 troops to the 
Persian Gulf to deter an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Less than three days after the 
announcement, Iraqi troops pull back from the Iraq-Kuwait border.  
 
08/30/1995: NATO begins strikes on Serbia 
NATO, with a strong contingent of American forces, begins two weeks of air attacks 
on Serbian positions. 
 
09/03/1996: Missile strikes Iraq 
President Clinton orders a cruise missile strike against Iraq after Saddam Hussein 
leads a siege against the Kurdish city of Irbil in northern Iraq.  
 
12/16/1998: Retaliatory attacks on Iraq 
President Clinton orders a three-day bombing attack against Iraq after Saddam 
Hussein refuses to cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors.  
 
03/24/1999: NATO attack on Serbia 
In response to Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Albania, and reports of ethnic 
cleansing, the United States leads NATO attacks against Serbia. On February 23, 
Serbian and Kosovar representatives had agreed to a plan that would have granted 
more autonomy to Kosovo over a three-year period. Serbia reneged on the agreement, 




  Hard Power- Economic Incident 
 
12/08/1993: NAFTA creates free trade zone 
After a hard-fought battle in Congress, President Clinton signs the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), eliminating nearly every trade barrier between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico, creating the world’s largest free trade zone.  
 
02/03/1994: Vietnam trade embargo lifted 
President Clinton ends the nineteen-year old trade embargo against Vietnam, noting 
that Vietnam is indeed trying to locate 2,238 Americans listed as missing in action 
since the Vietnam War.  
 
05/26/1994: China trade status renewed 
President Clinton renews China’s Most Favored Nation trade status, even though 
China has not made as much progress on human rights issues as he had hoped. 
 
01/31/1995: Emergency loans to Mexico 
President Clinton authorizes the U.S. Treasury Department to make an emergency 
loan of up to $20 billion to Mexico to forestall a financial crisis threatening the 
interconnected Mexican and American economies.  
 
11/15/1999: Trade with China 
The United States and China agree to a trade treaty reducing tariffs and other trade 
barriers. The treaty is to come into effect after China joins the World Trade 
Organization and Congress grants permanent normal trade relations between the two 
countries.  
 
03/08/2000: Permanent trade relations with China 
President Clinton sends a bill to Congress asking for permanent normal trade 
relations with China. After securing House (May 24) and Senate (September 19) 




  Soft Power- Diplomatic Incident 
 
07/25/1994: Israel-Jordan talks 
President Clinton meets with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and King 
Hussein of Jordan. The talks result in Israel and Jordan agreeing in principle to end 
nearly fifty years of official antagonism.  
 
09/18/1994: Haiti general cedes power 
After a tense stand-off with the Clinton administration, Haiti’s military government, 
led by General Raoul Cedras, agrees to cede power. The administration, along with 
the United Nations, had tried for over a year to restore the democratically elected 
president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in a coup on 
September 30, 1991. 
 
12/01/1994: General Agreement on Tariffs approved 
The Senate votes to approve the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
that 117 nations, including the United States, agree to in December 1993. The 
agreement cuts tariffs by more than a third on a wide-range of products and creates a 
freer international market for goods. 
 
12/05/1994: START I signed in Budapest 
President Clinton, along with the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine, signs the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in Budapest, 
Hungary. The treaty eliminates more than 9,000 warheads. 
 
07/11/1995: U.S. recognizes Vietnam 
The United States extended full diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, twenty-two years 
after the United States withdrew military forces from that country. 
 
10/23/1995: Improving U.S.-Russia relations 
President Clinton and Russian president Yeltsin meet in Hyde Park, New York, and 
continue to discuss ways to improve relations between their two nations, especially 
with regard to the issue of nuclear arms. 
 
11/21/1995: Dayton Peace Accords Reached 
On November 21, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were initialed in Dayton, Ohio; 
they were formally signed in Paris, France, on December 14, 1995. The agreement 
was reached between the warring nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and 
Serbia. It sought to end one of the worst European conflicts since World War II, 
 
03/21/1997: Further nuclear negotiations begin 
President Clinton and President Yeltsin of Russia meet at Helsinki, Finland, and 
agree to begin negotiations on another nuclear arms reduction treaty (START III) as 
soon as both nations ratify START II. The United States Senate had ratified START 
II in January 1996.  
 
04/24/1997: Chemical Weapons become illegal 
The Senate ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, making illegal the 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons.  
 
10/28/1997: President Clinton welcomes President Jiang Zemin of China for an 
official 




07/11/2000: Israeli peace summit 
President Clinton hosts Israeli leader Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser 
Arafat at Camp David in the hope of reaching a peace agreement. After two weeks of 




  Soft Power- Informational Incident 
 
11/29/1995: Clinton urges peace in Ireland 
During a tour of Europe, President Clinton urges the continuation of peace efforts in 
Northern Ireland where longstanding conflict between Irish Protestants and Catholics 
escalated to violence over issues of economic and political autonomy. 
 
06/03/2000: First summit with Putin 
President Clinton holds his first summit meeting with Russian president Vladimir 
Putin. They reaffirm their nations’ commitment to strategic arms reductions, but 
disagree over American plans to research and develop a missile-defense system.  







Appendix B: Word Frequency Chart 





         
leader  24 33 47 36 59 43 55 42.4 
Values  5 10 12 15 18 19 46 17.9 
Identity   0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.4 
Ideals   1 4 5 2 3 2 6 3.3 
Selective   3 4 5 4 2 5 4 3.9 
Total pages  29 41 49 34 61 54 84 50.3 
State of the 
Union 
Addresses 
         
Leader  7 14 6 6 6 8 7 7.7 
Values  6 5 5 3 2 0 3 3.4 
Identity   0 1 1* 0 1* 0 0 0.2 
Ideals   0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0.6 
Selective   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total pages  13 17 12 13 13 16 18 14.6 
Inaugural 
Addresses 
         
Leader 0    0    0 
Values 0    3    1.5 
Identity  0    0    0 
Ideals  0    2    1 
Selective  0    0    0 
Total pages 5    8    6.5 
Note. * indicates specific reference to national identity. Searches included derivatives and 





Appendix C: Strategic Analysis Models 
1.  PESTEL- An organization’s structural analysis tool that considers the Political, 
Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal external factors impacting 
their strategic environment (Sawalha, 2017).  This model promotes the 
“contextualization” of chosen strategies that consider important dimensions of the 
operating environment. 
2. S=E+W+M- Strategy is the combination of Ends (terminal objectives) and Ways 
(the chosen methods) and Means (the tools or chosen national resources) (Lykke, 1989).  
This concept was published by Colonel Lykke and has been the taught as the cornerstone 
of strategy planning by the military for decades (Cavanaugh, 2017).  Grand strategy is 
often referred to as the coordination of the national interest “ends” and national power 
“means”. 
3. SWOT- A strategic planning tool primarily used for situational examination, as 
opposed to recurring long-term analysis.  The tool compares an organization’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats within specific temporal and spatial limits.  
4. Ascher-Overholt Model of Political Forecasting- This strategic planning model, 
developed by William Ascher and William Overholt in 1983, decries quantitative 
methodologies as less-effective for political forecasting because they fail to account for 
social nuances.  This strategic planning model focuses on three considerations for 
political forecasting: a) the power dynamics between individuals and organizations; b) 
the political environment within which political events play out; and c) the changes and 
continuities in actor strategies and authoritative policies.  This scenario-based approach to 
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political forecasting is especially useful to political leaders with considerable influence 
over their national resources and the ability to weigh choices, like those in many 
republics (Ascher & Overholt, 1983)   
5. Porter-5 Forces- The Porter-5 Strategic Model was developed by Dr. Michael 
Porter in the Harvard Business Review (1979).  This model focuses on analyzing 
competitive forces, and their sources, within one’s strategic environment. 
 
The “5 I’s” of the Porter-5 Forces are dimensions of analysis, which include: a) 
Internal organizational structure and processes; b) International arena, including regional 
competitors which constitute the competitive factors in the external environment; c) 
Information- risks include the timely access and transfer of critical information to 
decision-makers and local actors; d) Infrastructure risks include software and network 
vulnerabilities as well as physical equipment and structures; e) Influences include 
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external demands from stakeholders, laws, and higher-echelon policy mandates and 
treaties (Rice, 2010). 
The unique aspect of this model is its observance on strategic competitors and 
stakeholders’ underlying influences (sort of looking at the stakeholders’ stakeholders).  
Analyzing underlying influences can significantly enhance the qualities and accuracies of 
predictive model.  While this model was originally designed for industry-level 
perspectives, incorporating the model to national security requires substituting the 
international arena for the industry, and moving from a program or enterprise-level 
analysis to a security and national interests’ perspective (Rice, 2010). 
6. DIME- The 1988 NSS (p. 7) outlines the elements of American national military 
strategy as diplomatic, informational (public diplomacy and cultural attraction), military, 
and economic.  President Reagan’s NSS also included America’s moral legitimacy and 
leadership in world affairs as critical components of national strength and opportunity.  
He also stipulated America’s sources of national power work best when enlisted in 
harmonic balance and in conjunction with strong international alliances. 
7. Hard Power, Soft Power- This phrase categorizing national power was coined by 
Joseph Nye (2004) to describe hard power as the use of military tools (e.g. prepositioning 
troops and tools of war, war, alliances), and economic tools (aid, sanctions, bribes, trade 
agreements) (p. 31).  Soft Power is the use of diplomacy (attraction, cultural affinity, 
agreements) and information (public speeches, diplomatic signaling) to achieve 
international goals. 
 
